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The Development of the Collyer
Deferral Doctrine
Peter G. Nash*
Roland P. Wilder, Jr.**
Alan Banov***
Collyer Insulated Wire' has been one of the most significant
decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) in recent
years..That case established the principle' that the policies of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) 2 could best be effectuated if the Board deferred resolution of disputes based primarily
on the meaning and application of a collective-bargaining agreement to the grievance-arbitration provisions of the parties' agreement. While the underpinnings of Collyer are traceable to wellestablished NLRB and judicial precedents, the decision is nonetheless an important new "developmental step"'3 that has precipitated
far-reaching changes in the Board's approach to processing and deciding unfair labor practice cases. In succeeding decisions, the
Board has expanded its application of Collyer, while refining the
criteria necessary for deferral. This article will review and analyze
the development of those policies into what is now called the
"Collyer doctrine."

I. THE HOLDING IN Collyer
The complaint in Collyer alleged that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act 4 during the term of its collectivebargaining agreement by unilaterally (1) increasing the wage rates
for certain skilled maintenance employees; (2) directing that worm
*
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* * * Attorney, Office of General Counsel, Division of Advice; A.B., University of North
Carolina (Chapel Hill); J.D., George Washington University.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and are not necessarily the
views of the National Labor Relations Board.
1. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970).
3. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
4. Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), makes it "an unfair labor practice for
*an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)."
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gear removal and cleaning be performed by a single maintenance
machinist rather than by two; and (3) changing wage rates for extruder operators. 5 During negotiations, the union had rejected management's proposal that maintenance employees receive wage raises in
addition to those being negotiated for the production and maintenance unit generally. As a result, the contract contained no provision for such raises. After the contract was executed, the employer
continued to inform the union of its desire to raise the maintenance
employees' rates; ultimately it gave the union five days' notice of
its plan to adjust their wages. When the union protested and asked
for a reevaluation of all jobs in the plant, the employer agreed to
consider a plant-wide evaluation, contingent upon the union's
agreement to the increase for skilled tradesmen.'
The Board's Trial Examiner found that the increase went into
effect over the union's objections.' While finding that the employer
unlawfully made unilateral changes in the maintenance employees'
wages and in the worm gear operation, the Trial Examiner found
that the change in computing incentive rates for extruder operations
had been discussed at two meetings and was sanctioned by the
contract and practice under it.' The Board majority, however,
agreed with the employer's contention that the dispute was "essentially. . . over the terms and meaning of the contract between the
Union and the Respondent," and held that the "dispute should have
been resolved pursuant to the [grievance-arbitration provisions of
the] contract . . . .9
In the Board's view, the circumstances of the case weighed
heavily in favor of deferral to the parties' grievance-arbitration procedures for resolution of the dispute.
[T]his dispute arises within the confines of a long and productive collectivebargaining relationship. The parties before us have, for 35 years, mutually and
voluntarily resolved the conflicts which inhere in collective bargaining ...
[N]o claim is made of enmity by Respondent to employees' exercise of protected rights. Respondent here has credibly asserted its willingness to resort
to arbitration under a clause providing for arbitration in a very broad range of
disputes and unquestionably broad enough to embrace this dispute.

Finally .

5.

.

. the dispute is one eminently well suited to resolution by

192 N.L.R.B. at 837-38.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 839, 866. Effective August 19, 1972, the title of "Trial Examiner" was changed
to "Administrative Law Judge." As hereinafter used in this article, the abbreviations "TXD"
and "JD" shall stand for Trial Examiner's decision and Administrative Law Judge's decision,
respectively.
8. Id. at 839, 865-66.
9. Id. at 837 (opinion of Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy).
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arbitration. The contract and its meaning in present circumstances lie at the
center of this dispute.'"

The Board dismissed the complaint. Recognizing, however, that it
could not prejudge "the regularity or statutory acceptability of the
result in an arbitration proceeding which has not occurred,"' the
Board retained jurisdiction over the matter
for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further
consideration upon a proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with
reasonable promptness after the issuance of this decision, either been resolved
by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to
arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not 2been fair
and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act.'

The Collyer majority, including Member Gerald A. Brown, concurring, based their disposition upon statutory and decisional precedents that will be examined hereinafter to facilitate understanding of the arbitration deferral doctrine that has emanated from
Collyer. That examination will be followed by an analysis of the
Board's current requirements for deferral and the extent to which
the factors that influenced deferral in Collyer have remained viable
considerations in the Board's formulation and application of that
doctrine.
II. THE AUTHORITY FOR PROSPECTIVE ARBITRATION DEFERRAL

The Board has explicated Collyer in subsequent cases, which
constitute the principal focus of this article, and the General Counsel is already on record as "unreservedly" supporting the Board's
prospective deferral policies. 3 Since, however, the Collyer doctrine
remains somewhat controversial'-despite its application for over
10. Id. at 842.
I1. Id.
12. Id. at 843. In Collyer and its progeny the Board has indicated that any such review
of arbitral awards will be governed by the principles established in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R..B. 1080, 1082 (1955). See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 15 (July 31,
1972), motion for further consideration denied, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 2-3 (Sept. 11, 1973);
192 N.L.R.B. at 841-43.
13. See, e.g., First Questions from Collyer, Address by Peter Nash before the FMCSAAA Regional Conference on Labor Arbitration, Buffalo, N.Y., Oct. 15, 1971, reported in
BNA 1971 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 151. NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller, moreover, has
defended the majority's position on several occasions. See, e.g., Little Collyer Grows Up,
Address before the Industrial Relations Research Association, Oakland, Calif., Sept. 12, 1972,
N.L.R.B. Release No. 1255; A Case Story, Address before Conference of Western States
Employer Association Executives, Pebble Beach, Calif., Aug. 27, 1971, reported in 78 LAB.
REL. REP. 28 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Deferral to Arbitration; Rights of Strikers, 84 LAB. REL. REP. 72, 73-74
(1973) (remarks of Francis F. Sulley and Robert E. Fitzgerald at F.B.A. Convention, Chicago,
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two years-a reiteration of the legal and pragmatic principles supporting it may be warranted. In essence, Collyer was bottomed on
(1) the Board's discretion to reserve jurisdiction in disputes involving arguable breaches of contract; (2) the "hospitable acceptance"'"
accorded arbitration by the NLRB and the courts; and (3) practical
considerations. Although there is some overlap in these bases, they
will be discussed separately to the extent that it is possible to do
SO.
A.

The Basis for the Board's Discretion

Finding that the "dispute in its entirety [arose] from the contract between the parties, and from the parties' relationship under
the contract,"' 6 the Collyer majority recognized that the decision
whether to defer to the parties' agreed-upon contractual remedy
"compels an accommodation between, on the one hand, the statutory policy favoring the fullest use of collective bargaining and the
arbitral process and, on the other, the statutory policy reflected by
Congress' grant to the Board of exclusive jurisdiction to prevent
unfair labor practices."'" Those statutory policies are expressed in
sections 10(a)'8 of the NLRA and 203(d)'9 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (LMRA).
Sept. 12-15, 1973); ABA Panel Views on Boys Market, Collyer Rulings, 83 LAB. REL. REP. 355,
356-57 (1973) (remarks of Patrick C. O'Donoghue, Evan J. Spelfogel, and Thomas G.S.
Christensen at A.B.A. Convention, Washington, D.C., Aug. 7, 1973).
As demonstrated in the later cases in which the Board deferred to arbitration, Member
John A. Penello, appointed in 1971 to replace Member Gerald Brown, generally has joined
with Chairman Miller and Member Ralph E. Kennedy to vote for deferral, and Members
John H. Fanning and Howard Jenkins, Jr., regularly have dissented, as they did in Collyer.
See, e.g., Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (Aug. 1, 1973); United Aircraft
Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (July 10, 1973); Houston Mailers Union No. 36 (Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.), 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Oct. 18, 1972); Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc.,
199 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (Oct. 2, 1972); Appalachian Power Co.. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (July 31.
1972); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (June 21, 1972). But cf. Jemco, Inc.. 203
N.L.R.B. No. 32 (Apr. 30, 1973) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting); Radio Television Technical
School, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (Oct. 10, 1972), enforced, 488 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1973).
15. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey
v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
16. 192 N.L.R.B. at 839.
17. Id. at 841.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). The relevant portion of that section is set forth in the
succeeding paragraph of the text.
19. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1970), provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
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Although the NLRB is empowered to resolve unfair labor practice issues arising out of contractual disputes, the Act does not
require it to exercise that power in every case. Section 10(a) of the
Act provides that the Board's authority to decide such matters
"shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise . . ." But neither the legislative history of section
may
10(a)20 nor the case law interpreting it 2' suggests that the Board
22
not defer to means of adjustment established by agreement.
Even before enactment of section 203(d)2 as part of the LMRA,
the Board occasionally refrained from deciding unfair labor practice
cases that essentially involved alleged contract breaches. Thus, in
ConsolidatedAircraft Corp.,2 1 the Board dismissed such charges and
asserted:
[lit will not effectuate the statutory policy of 'encouraging the practice and
procedures of collective bargaining' for the Board to assume the role of policing
collective contracts between employers and labor organizations by attempting
20. See H.R. REP. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 53, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AcT, 1947, 556 (1947) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.
LMRAJ. To be sure, Congress rejected a proposal by Senator Wagner that the original Act
contain a clause expressly providing that the Board "may in its discretion, defer its exercise
of jurisdiction over any such unfair labor practice in any case where there is another means
of prevention provided for by agreement .... " S. 1958, § 10(b), 74th Cong., 1st Sess., I
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1301 (1935) [hereinafter cited as

LEG. HIsT.J; Debates on S. 1958 in Senate, 79 CONG. REc. 7651, I LEG. HIsT. 2351 (1935).
Whatever inferences may be drawn from that omission, the legislative history of the TaftHartley amendments, outlined below, demonstrates that by 1947 Congress had recognized the
value of arbitration as a means of settling disputes. Accordingly, Congress, through the
enactment of § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1970), accorded the federal courts and arbitrators, rather than the Board,
primary responsibility for applying and enforcing collective-bargaining agreements. See also
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
21. In a case in which the Board eschewed deference to an arbitral award and found
that the employer violated the Act, the court of appeals that enforced the NLRB order
asserted:
Clearly, agreements between parties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the Board....
Therefore, we believe the Board may exercise jurisdiction in any case of an unfair labor
practice when in its discretion its interference is necessary to protect the public rights
defined in the Act. The Board, then, had discretionary power to exercise its jurisdiction
in the instant case.
NLRB v. Walt Disney Prod., 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945).
See also NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 116 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 1940); Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 501 (1946), enforcement denied on othergrounds, 161 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1947).
22. 192 N.L.R.B. at 840.
23. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1970). For the text of this section see note 19 supra.
24. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
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to decide whether disputes as to the meaning and administration of such
contracts constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. On the contrary, we
believe that parties to collective contracts would thereby be encouraged to
abandon their efforts to dispose of disputes under the contracts through collective bargaining or through settlement procedures mutually agreed upon by
them, and to remit the interpretation and administration of their contracts to
the Board. We therefore do not deem it wise to exercise our jurisdiction in
rights and remedies
such a case, where the parties have not exhausted their
2
under the contract as to which the dispute has arisen. -

Although the Board did not uniformly follow Consolidated
Aircraft,21 the majority in Collyer27 properly regarded it as precedent
for deferring to arbitration even before any party has invoked the
grievance-arbitration machinery.
The addition of section 203(d) to the LMRA provided further
statutory support for the Board's deference to arbitration for resolution of contractual disputes. The legislative history of this and other
1947 amendments demonstrates that Congress anticipated a Board
policy of deferral in cases involving both a possible breach of contract and an arguable unfair labor practice. When the Senate Labor
Committee reported out Senate bill 1126, which would have made
it an unfair labor practice for employers or unions to "violate the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement or the terms of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration, "2 it stated:
25. Id. at 706 (quoting from § 1 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)). See Vickers, Inc.,
153 N.L.R.B. 561 (1965); Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143
N.L.R.B. 1311, 1312 (1963); Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418, 423 (1962); United
Tel. Co. of the West, 112 N.L.R.B. 779, 781 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B.
930, 934 (1954); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); cf. Office & Professional
Employees Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dresser Indus. Valve &
Instru. Div., 178 N.L.R.B. 317 n.1 (1969).
26. See, e.g., Combined Paper Mills, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 483, 485-86 (1969); Wisconsin
S. Gas Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 480 (1968); Unit Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600, 602 (1968),
enforced, 412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1969); Gravenslund Operating Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 365 (1967);
Adelson, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 513 (1967); Scam Instru. Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 284, 289-90 (1967),
enforced, 394 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968); American Fire Apparatus
Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1322-23 (1966), enforced, 380 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1967); C & S Indus.,
Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 459-60 (1966); Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296, 298-99 (1966);
Century Papers, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965); Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567,
1569-70 (1965), enforced, 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967); American Sign Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 537,
544 (1965); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506, 1508-09 (1964); LeRoy Mach. Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1414-16 (1964); cf. Puerto
Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950, 965-68 (1964), enforced as modified, 359 F.2d 983 (1st Cir.
1966); Square D Co,, 142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
27. In Consolidated Aircraft and the cases cited at note 25 supra, the complaints were
dismissed entirely. While it refrained from deciding the merits of the dispute and technically
"dismissed" the complaint in Collyer, the Board, recognizing that it had taken a "developmental step," 192 N.L.R.B. at 843, retained jurisdiction for the limited purpose recited in
the text accompanying note 12 supra.
28. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1947, reprinted in I LEG. HIST. LMRA 99,
111 (1947).
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The committee wishes to make it clear that by this provision . . it is not
intended that the National Labor Relations Board shall undertake to adjudicate all disputes alleging breach of labor agreements. Any such course would
be inimical to the development by the parties themselves of adequate
grievance-handling and voluntary arbitration machinery. It is the purpose of
this bill to encourage free-collective bargaining; it would not be conducive to
that objective if the Board became the forum for trying day-to-day grievances
or if in the guise of unfair labor practice cases it entertained damage actions
arising out of breach of contract. Hence the committee anticipates that the
Board will develop by rules and regulations a policy of entertaining under these
provisions only such cases alleging violation of contract as cannot be settled
by resort to the machinery established by the contract itself, voluntary arbitration, or if necessary, by litigation in court. Any other course would engulf the
Board with a vast number of petty cases that could best be settled by other
means. In short, the intention of the committee in this regard is that cases of
contract violation be entertained on a highly selective basis, when it is demonstrated to the Board that alternative methods of settling the dispute have been
exhausted or are not available.?

Significantly, the proposed amendments were deleted competely
from the final version of the bill, with this explanation: "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of
that contract should be left to the usual process of law and not to
the NLRB." 30
In denying the Board "plenary authority to administer and
enforce collective bargaining agreements," Congress established
arbitrators and the courts as "the principal sources of contract inter3
pretation" 31 when it enacted section 301 as part of the LMRA. 1
While Congress in passing section 301 admittedly did not preclude
the Board from interpreting contract clauses in the course of adjudicating alleged unfair labor practices,3 it cannot be urged obversely
29. Id. at 23, I LEG. HIST. LMRA at 429. The quoted comments were directed to that
portion of the bill addressed to unions. A similar discussion occurred relative to the companion provision applying to employers. Id. at 20-21, I LEG. HisT. LMRA at 426-27.
30. H.R. Rep. No. 510, supra note 20, at 42, I LEG. HIST. LMRA at 546. See also Textile
1
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957).
31. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1969). The Supreme Court has also noted
that Congress, in enacting § 301, "decided to make collective bargaining agreements enforceable only in the courts." Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511 (1962).

32. In relevant part, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), provides: "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. .. "
33. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967). In Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at
841, the Board emphatically dismissed any suggestions that it was abdicating altogether its
jurisdiction over unfair labor practices:
The question whether the Board should withhold its process arises, of course, only when
a set of facts may present not only an alleged violation of the Act but also an alleged
breach of the collective-bargaining agreement subject to arbitration.
Cf. L.E.M., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 99, at 6-7 (Aug. 4, 1972), where the Board majority
asserted:

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

that the Board is compelled to decide contractual disputes involving
unfair labor practices, particularly where the contract provides specifically for binding arbitration.-4 In NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp.,3 where the Board's authority to interpret contracts was upheld, the Supreme Court noted that "the collective bargaining
agreement contained no arbitration clause. The contract did provide grievance procedures," the Court continued, "but the end result of those procedures, if differences between the parties remained
unresolved, was economic warfare, not 'the therapy of arbitration.' ",36 The Court went on to assert that the Board's action in not
deferring "was in no way inconsistent with its previous recognition
of arbitration as 'an instrument of national labor policy for composing contractual differences.' ',
That arbitration plays a prominent role in the national labor
policy cannot be doubted. Following its holding in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills" that executory agreements to arbitrate are
enforceable under section 301, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
insisted that the parties adhere to their agreed upon grievance arbitration procedures.3 9 Thus, in United Steelworkers v. American
Manufacturing Co.,4" the Court emphasized that the congressional
policy expressed in section 203(d) "can be effectuated only if the
Although we do not agree with the Respondent that the Board lacks jurisdiction to
decide this controversy, we do believe that the dispute is based on the parties' interpretation of the contract, and would be best resolved through the grievance procedure pro.
vided for in the parties' contract.
See also National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 15-16 (July 31, 1972).
34. In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962), the Court later acknowledged the concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB and the courts and stated: "The authority of
the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining
contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction
of the courts in suits under § 301" (emphasis added). See also NLRB v. Local 378, Iron
Workers, 473 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1973); Lodge 1327, Machinists v. Fraser & Johnston Co., 454
F.2d 88, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1971); Office & Professional Employees Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d
314 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Unit Drop Forge Div. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 108, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965); Lummus Co. v. NLRB,
339 F.2d 728, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
35. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
36. Id. at 426.
37. Id. (quoting from International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 926).
38. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This decision has been said to go "a long way towards making
arbitration the central institution in the administration of collective bargaining contracts."
Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on
Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1557 (1963) (quoted approvingly in Boys Markets.
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970)).
39. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
40. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under
a collective bargaining agreement is given full play."' " Similarly, in
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,4" the Supreme Court gave effect to "the congressional policy in favor of
settlement of disputes by the parties through the machinery of arbitration" by holding that "the judicial inquiry under section 301
must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant
party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the
arbitrator power to make the award he made." 43 The following standard established by the Court for resolving those questions amounts
to a veritable presumption of arbitrability:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage;"

More recently, the Supreme Court had occasion in Boys
Markets45 to reaffirm "the congressional policy to promote the
peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration." That
case upheld the authority of the federal courts to enjoin strikes over
arbitrable grievances, despite the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.46 The Court's accommodation of the policies
of Norris-LaGuardia and sections 203(d) and 301 of the LMRA was
predicated upon "the importance that Congress has attached generally to the voluntary settlement of labor disputes without self-help
and more particularly to arbitration as a means to this end."47
41. Id. at 566. Recognizing the special value of arbitration and the ability of arbitrators
to interpret contracts, the Court went on to observe that, in actions to compel arbitration,
courts "have no business weighing the merits of the grievance." Id. at 568. In reversing the
Court of Appeals, which regarded the disputed grievance as "a frivolous, patently baseless
one, not subject to arbitration," Id. at 566, quoting, 264 F.2d 624, 628, the Supreme Court
Id.
declared: "The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values ....
at 568. See also Cox, Current Problems in the Law of GrievanceArbitration, 30 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 247, 261 (1958) (cited in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
568 n.6 (1960)).
42. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). This case is one of 3 Supreme Court cases collectively referred
to as the Steelworkers Trilogy. The other cases comprising the trilogy are United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) and United Steelworkers v. American

Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
43. Id. at 582.
44.

Id. at 582-83. Since the Steelworkers Trilogy was founded upon judicial recognition

of the efficacy of and necessity for arbitration, the Court's rationale for such a formula is
discussed below in the context of the pragmatic bases of the Collyer doctrine.
45. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970). See also Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629, 636-637 (1974); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95, 105 (1962).
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
47. 398 U.S. at 252. See also 398 U.S. at 241-43, 249, 253.
On February 19, 1974, the Supreme Court held that an employee's statutory right to trial
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Although some of the aforementioned principles deal primarily
with the relationship between the courts and arbitration rather than
that between the Board and the arbitrator, they clearly manifest the
respect accorded by the Supreme Court to the arbitral process. The
Board has a decisive role to play in determining the success or
failure of the national policy of encouraging peaceful settlement of
industrial disputes through arbitration rather than through economic warfare. The Board's promotion of that policy" is particularly compatible with the design of the Act to encourage "practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes" and
"the practice and procedure of collective-bargaining." 49 For the
Collyer doctrine not only furthers the "basic policy of national legislation to promote the arbitral process,""0 but also, by requiring that
signatories to contracts obey their own agreements to arbitrate disputes,5 supports the principles of good-faith collective bargaining
under the Act.5 2 These policy considerations underlying Collyer
have been summarized succinctly by former Board Member Gerald

Brown:
de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (Supp. II, 1972), was not foreclosed by prior submission of his claim of racial discrimination to final and binding arbitration under the collective-bargaining agreement between his
employer and bargaining representative. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4214
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1974). Distinguishing between review of an arbitrator's decision under the
Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 42, and the plaintiff's exercise of a "statutory right independent of the arbitration process," id. at 4219, the Court, in a unanimous opinion, declared that
neither Title VII nor its legislative history suggests any congressional intent to bar the employee's cause of action, whether on the district court's election-of-remedies theory or because
of any purported waiver by his bargaining representative. Id. at 4216-9. The Court also
rejected the notion, advanced by the respondent employer, that "federal courts should defer
to arbitral decisions on discrimination claims where: (i) the claim was before the arbitrator;
(ii) the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the.
suit under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim and to fashion
a remedy." Id. at 4220. Because Gardner-Denverwas handed down just before the galley proof
of this article was transmitted to the printer, and since the statutory schemes of Title VII
and the NLRA are substantially different, it is not possible at this time to determine whether
this recent decision will have any impact upon the Board's policies under Collyer.
48. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843 (1970).
49. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
50. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
51. The Supreme Court asserted in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 547 (1960), that "arbitration of labor disputes is part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself." Id. at 578. In addition, the Court there recognized that an obvious
therapeutic value inheres in the grievance process: "The processing of disputes through the
grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 581. See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB,
161 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1947); Cox, supra note 41, at 261.
52. See National Labor Relations Act 99 8(a)(5) & 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. 99 158(a) &
(b)(3) (1970). Section 8(a)(5) is set forth in note 4 supra. Section 8(b)(3) provides that it is
"an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .to refuse to bargain
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The grievance-arbitration process is one of the most important tools of
collective bargaining, and the raisond'etre of the National Labor Relations Act
is to encourage collective bargaining . . . Certainly great damage could be
done to the entire system of grievance arbitration, and to the process of collective bargaining, if parties believed they could ignore an agreed-upon method
of settling disputes. Since in most cases deferring to arbitration will encourage
collective bargaining, the Board. in carrying out the Act's purpose, should see
53
that full play is given to the arbitral process. (Footnotes omitted).

B.

Board Deferral to Arbitration and Acceptance Thereof

Cognizant of the congressional and judicial approval of arbitration as an effective means for resolving labor disputes, the Board for
years has deferred to the arbitral process in several contexts. First,
the Board developed, and consistently applied, a policy of deferring
to outstanding arbitration decisions when the arbitral proceedings
satisfied certain criteria. The standards for acceptance of arbitration awards initially were enunciated in Spielberg Manufacturing
Co.5" There the Board dismissed a complaint in deference to an
existing arbitration award (as distinguished from an existing procedure, as in Collyer) since the arbitration proceedings that led to that
award appeared to have been "fair and regular, all parties had
agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel [was]
not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."5 In
addition to these three conditions, the Board later emphasized the
requirement, which had been met in Spielberg, that there be an
identity between the unfair labor practice issues before it and the
contractual questions decided by the arbitrator. 6
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to
the provisions of Section 9(a)." In relevant part, § 8(d) defines the duty to "bargain collectively" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
53. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 844 (1970) (concurring opinion); cf. Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94, at 6 (July 6, 1973); Chase
Mfg., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128, at 2 (Dec. 13, 1972), enforced, No. 73-1270 (7th Cir., Feb.
5, 1974) (unpublished order).
54. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
55. Id. at 1082. See Local 18, Operating Engineers (Frazier Davis Constr. Co.), 145
N.L.R.B. 1492 (1964); Raley's Supermarkets, 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963); Denver-Chicago
Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961) (deferral to an award of a bipartite panel composed
of employer and union representatives); I. Oscherwitz & Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1079
(1961); cf. Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.)B. 513, 514-15 (1963) (all members of bipartite
panel "arrayed in common interest against the individual grievant"); Gateway Transportation Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962) (arbitral proceeding not fair and regular); Honolulu StarBulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395, 408 (1959), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 274 F.2d
567 (D.C. Cir. 1959), modified, 126 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1960).
56. See Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (June 26, 1972); Airco Indus.
Gases-Pacific, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-86 (1963),
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The courts not only have uniformly affirmed the Board's decisions deferring to arbitral awards, but also have commented favorably upon the Spielberg policy. In Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.57 the Supreme Court stated:
'There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the subject of
an arbitration proceeding and award. Section 10(a) of the Act expressly makes
this plain, and the courts have uniformly so held. However, it is equally well
established that the Board has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act.
'The Act, as has repeatedly been stated, is primarily designed to promote
industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining. Experience has demonstrated that collective-bargaining
agreements that provide for final and binding arbitration of grievances and
disputes arising thereunder "as a substitute for industrial strife," contribute
significantly to the attainment of this statutory objective."

Prior to Collyer, the Board also deferred when the parties had
begun, either voluntarily or pursuant to a district court order, to
arbitrate the dispute. In Dubo Manufacturing Corp.,5" for example,
the employer allegedly discharged and refused to reinstate employees in violation of section 8(a)(3). The Board deferred action on
these allegations, pending completion of arbitration directed by a
district court in a section 301 action instituted by the union against
the employer. Relying upon section 203(d) of the LMRA,6 ° and noting Spielberg's recognition of existing arbitration awards, the Board
reasoned that "[i]t would certainly frustrate the intent expressed
by Congress if the Board were now to permit the use of the Board's
processes to enable the parties to avoid their contractual obligations
enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961).
57. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).

58. Id. at 271 (quoting from International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 926). See

NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1971); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962); Associated Press v. NLRB, Nos. 73-1002 & 73-1390, slip opinion, 810 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 20, 1974); Radio Television Technical School, Inc. v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 457
(3d Cir. 1973); John Klann Moving & Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969); Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 280
(8th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Auburn Rubber Co., 384 F.2d 1, 3-4 (10th Cir. 1967); Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (1964); cf. NLRB v. Walt Disney Prod., 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944).
59. 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963). See Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 111,
at 7 (Oct. 16, 1973) (JD); Theodore P. Mansour, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 29, at 4-7 (Sept. 22, 1972)
(TXD); NLRB General Counsel Administrative Ruling in Case No. SR-2615, 52 L.R.R.M.
1405 (1963); Arbitrationand the NLRB-A Second Look, Speech by former NLRB General
Counsel Arnold Ordman before the National Academy of Arbitrators, San Francisco, Mar.
3, 1967, reported in BNA 1967 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 197, 202; cf. Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B.
1561 (1961); United Tel. Co. of the West, 112 N.L.R.B. 779, 780-81 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft

Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930, 933-35 (1954).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970). The text of this section is set forth in note 19 supra.
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as interpreted by the court."'"
Another case that not only presaged Collyer, but also provided
substantial support for the plurality opinions therein, was Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co. 6" Although Schlitz cited neither the SpielbergDubo nor Consolidatedlines of cases, it brought them together in
the Board's attempt to postulate a policy of refraining from deciding
questions that depend upon contract interpretation. The complaint
in Schlitz alleged that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) by
unilaterally abandoning its systems of relieving employees individually in favor of shutting down the entire production line. In dismissing the complaint, the Board set forth virious factors that influenced it to defer to arbitration:
[W]e believe that where, as here, the contract clearly provides for grievance
and arbitrationmachinery, where the unilateralaction taken is not designed
to undermine the Union and is not patently erroneous but rather is based on
a substantial claim of contractualprivilege, and it appears that the arbitral
interpretationof the contract will resolve both the unfair labor practice issue
and the contract interpretationissue in a manner compatible with the purposes of the Act, then the Board should defer to the arbitration clause conceived by the parties. This particular case is indeed an appropriate one for just
such deferral. The parties have an unusually long established and successful
bargainingrelationship; they have a dispute involving substantive contract
interpretationalmost classical in its form, each party asserting a reasonable
claim in good faith in a situation wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated circumstances of any kind; they have a clearly defined grievancearbitration procedure which Respondent has urged the Union to use for resolving their dispute; and, significantly, the Respondent, the party which in fact
desires to abide by the terms of its contract, is the same party which, although
it firmly believed in good faith in its right under the contract to take the action
it did take, offered to discuss the entire matter with the Union prior to taking
such action. Accordingly, under the principles above stated, and the persuasive facts in this case, we believe that the policy of promoting industrial peace
and stability through collective bargaining obliges us to defer the parties to the
grievance-arbitration
procedures they themselves have voluntarily estab3
lished.'

Until its rationale was adopted by the Collyer majority,6" however,
61. 142 N.L.R.B. at 432. Following an arbitration decision on the dischargees' grievances, the Board later decided the § 8(a)(3) charges on their merits because no majority
consensus on the arbitration panel supported its award. 148 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1116 (1964).
62. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
63. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). Since the "swing" vote of Member Jenkins was based
upon his finding of a contract waiver, the deferral doctrine quoted in the text was not supported by a Board majority.
64. No article on Collyer would be complete without the observation that former Board
Member Gerald Brown had urged deference to prospective arbitration for years before he
wrote his concurring opinion in Collyer. Therein he listed his separate opinions in cases dating
from Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), in which he propounded that idea. 192 N.L.R.B.
at 844 n.19. He was joined by former Member Sam Zagoria in a dissent in Unit Drop Forge
Div., 171 N.L.R.B. 600, 604 (1968).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

the Schlitz decision, like ConsolidatedAircraft, 5 was not invariably
followed by the Board.6 6
As noted above, the Board has maintained policies of deferring
when the parties are pursuing arbitration or an arbitral award has
been rendered," and for years the courts have approved these policies." In Office and Professional Employees Local 425 v. NLRB, 6'
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, affirming a Board determination not to defer, made
these observations about the scope of the Board's discretion:
It is not the province of the court to supervise the Board in terms of sound
economy of administration, or to say whether we think it wise for an overworked Board to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated. It suffices for the
purposes of this case and the contention before us to say that we have no basis
for concluding that the Board is sailing without any rudder, or is charting a
course too far out to sea [by deferring in some instances, but not others].10

Through its Collyer doctrine, the Board is acting in accord not
only with statutory and decisional precedent that allow it to decline
jurisdiction over such matters, but also with the emphatic congressional and judicial approval of settling labor disputes through arbitral processes. Long before Collyer, it was recognized that the same
considerations upon which Spielberg was grounded come into play
when the alleged unfair labor practice issue had not yet been submitted to arbitration. As one commentator has stated:
There seems to be no difference in principle between Spielberg, where the
offices of the NLRB were invoked after an arbitral award had been rendered,
and the situation in which arbitration is available but is bypassed in favor of
proceedings before the NLRB. The consideration of "voluntary settlement" is
as much defeated by ignoring the contractual forum as by attempting to relitigate its award. The NLRB recognized this at an early date [in Consolidated

Aircraft].71

Significantly, the courts of appeal are now also endorsing the
Board's policy of deferring prospectively to arbitration.7 2 With its
65. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), enforced, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
66. See, e.g., DuQuoin Packing Co., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (June 24, 1970); Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 516 (1969); Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 676 (1969);
Dresser Indus. Valve, 178 N.L.R.B. 317 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 366 (1969);
Boston Edison Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 942 (1969).
67. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955).
68. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), and cases cited in note
58 supra.
69. 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
70. Id. at 320.
71. Dunau, ContractualProhibitionof UnfairLabor Practices:JurisdictionalProblems,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 59-60 (1957). See also Samoff, Arbitration,Not NLRB Intervention,
18 LAB. L.J. 602 (1967).
72. See Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973), enforcingTeamsters Local
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statement in Nabisco, the Second Circuit perhaps indicated the
direction other courts may take:
We cannot say that the Board has abused its discretion in the present cjase
in reaching the conclusion that federal labor policy would be furthered by
giving the grievance procedure a chance to work, while retaining jurisdiction
3

to step in if it did not.1

C. PragmaticBases for the Collyer Doctrine
The Collyer majority noted that contractual "disputes such as
these can better be resolved by arbitrators with special skill and
experience in deciding matters arising under established bargaining
relationships than by the application by this Board of a particular
provision of a statute. The necessity for such special skill and expertise is apparent upon examination of the [complex] issues arising
from Respondent's actions . . . ,,,7
In Warrior and Gulf 5 the Supreme Court praised the utility of grievance arbitration and the
singular competence of an arbitrator familiar with the parties' contract and bargaining history:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government .... [T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial selfgovernment. Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding
a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide
for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs
and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance
machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.
70 (National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (July 31, 1972); Associated Press v. NLRB,
Nos. 73-1002 & 73-1390 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 20, 1974), denying review of 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168
(Oct. 27, 1972); Provision House Workers Local 274 v. NLRB, No. 72-2617 (9th Cir., Feb. 21,
1974) (mem.), denying review of Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30,
1972); cf. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 85 L.R.R.M. 2274, 2278-79 n.9 (3d Cir. 1974); Radio
Television Technical School, Inc. v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1973); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers Local 6222, 454 F.2d 1333, 1337 (5th Cir. 1972);
International Bhd. of Machinists v. Fraser & Johnston Co., 454 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir. 1971).
73. 479 F.2d at 773.
74. 192 N.L.R.B. at 839. Finding that the dispute therein, as in Schlitz, was "one
eminently well suited to resolution by arbitration," the Board stated:
The contract and its meaning in present circumstances lie at the center of this
dispute. In contrast, the Act and its policies become involved only if it is determined
that the agreement between the parties, examined in the light of its negotiating history
and the practices of the parties thereunder, did not sanction Respondent's right to make
the disputed changes, subject to review if sought by the Union, under the contractually
prescribed procedure. That threshold determination is clearly within the expertise of a
mutually agreed-upon arbitrator. In this regard we note especially that here, as in
Schlitz, the dispute between these parties is the very stuff of labor contract arbitration.
Id. at 842.
75. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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. . .The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his
personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in
the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of
a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar
as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon
productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop,
his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their
under the agreement, to make the
common goal of uninterrupted production
6
agreement serve their specialized needs.

For years the Board has trusted the ability of arbitrators to
settle labor disputes arising under collective-bargaining agreements. Implicit in the Board's Spielberg7 policy of deferring to arbitral decisions is its understanding that the arbitrator addressed
himself to the relevant statutory issues, 8 for the Board will not defer
to such an award unless the arbitrator has explored those issues and
has made a judgment not repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act .7 The Collyer deferral doctrine resulted in large part from
the Board's experience under Spielberg0 that disputes which arguably involve unfair labor practices, as well as alleged breaches of
contract, can be resolved fairly by arbitrators."' The success of the
Spielberg policy is reflected in Collyer's reaffirmation82 of the standards 3 for accepting awards rendered after the parties have proceeded to arbitration, standards that protect the parties' statutory
rights from unfair proceedings and arbitral decisions that are
"clearly repugnant" to the Act.
Similarly significant is the extent to which employers and labor
organizations actually utilize arbitration in settling their disputes.
Not only do an overwhelming number of contracts contain
grievance-arbitration provisions," but also the use of arbitrators by
76. Id. at 580-82. See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
77. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
78. See, e.g., Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884 (1963); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961); cf. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928 (1962).
79. See John Klann Moving & Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 261,263 (6th Cir. 1969);
Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 280 (8th Cir. 1968).
80. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1086 (1955); cf. Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,
47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706-07 (1943).
81. See, e.g., Radioear Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 137, at 2-3 (Oct. 30, 1972) (citing
Indianapolis Union Printers, 46 LAB. ARB. 1077 (1966), and Stepan Chem. Co., 45

LAB. ARB.

34 (1965)); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971) (citing Atlanta Newspaper,
43 LAB. ARB. 758 (1964), and American Welding, 45 LAB. ARB. 812 (1965)); cf. Dunau, supra

note 71,
82.
83.
84.

at 64-81.
192 N.L.R.B. at 842-43.
See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
In Collyer Member Brown pointed out that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports
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disputing unions and employers has been increasing significantly. 5
Moreover, arbitrators are deciding a wide variety of issues, including discharge and disciplinary actions that otherwise would be the
subject of section 8(a) (3) charges." It is, therefore, no extraordinary
or novel procedure to which the Board is deferring in its Collyer
decisions.
The fact that arbitration generally provides a faster resolution
of disputes than does resolution by the Board lends additional support to the Collyer doctrine. In fiscal 1972, for example, an average
of 241.5 days were required from the filing of a grievance to the
issuance of an arbitration award through the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. This period included an average of 75.1 days
for processing a dispute through the grievance steps preliminary to
arbitration.87 In the same fiscal year a median of 316 days elapsed
from the filing of charges with the Board to the issuance of its
88
decision and order.
Rejecting the suggestion that Collyer is merely a device by the
Board to lighten its burgeoning caseload, Chairman Miller has asserted instead that the deferral policy was intended to encourage the
parties' use of their own forum for adjusting their problems." It
cannot be denied, however, that promotion of grievance arbitration
as the primary means for resolving contractual disputes ultimately
that 99% of 1,717 agreements analyzed in a continuing study contained grievance procedures
and that 94,% provided for arbitration. 192 N.L.R.B. at 844 n.20 (Brown, Member, concurring). It therefore is appropriate to observe that "contract grievance and arbitration procedures have become an integral part of virtually all collective-bargaining contracts in this
country." National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 17 (July 31, 1972). See also Menard,
The National Labor Relations Board-No Longer a Threat to the Arbitral Process? 23 LAB.
L.J. 140, 143 n.23 (1972).
85. See generally Dunau, supra note 71; Note, Dischargein the "Law" of Arbitration,
20 VAND. L. REv. 81 (1966). See also National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 at 17 n.9 (July
31, 1972) (statistics cited).
86. See generally Note, supra note 85.
87. Power, Improving Arbitration:Roles of Partiesand Agencies, 95 MON. LAB. Rv. 15,
21, Table 4 (Nov. 1972); cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 854 (Jenkins, Member,
dissenting).
88. In this connection, it might be noted that while § 10(b) of the Act provides a sixmonth statute of limitations, most contracts require that grievances be initiated within days
after the disputed action.
89. ABA Panel Views on Boys Markets, Collyer Rulings, 83 LAB. REL. REP. 355, 357
(Auc. 13, 1973). But see United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133, at 6 (July 10, 1973):
Being keenly aware of the limited resources of this agency, the Board is not particularly desirous of inviting any labor organization, particularly one representing employees
in so large a context as this, to bypass their own procedures and to seek adjudication by
the Board of the innumerable individual disputes which are likely to arise in the dayto-day relationship between employees and their immediate supervisors. ...
See also American Standard, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169, at 5 (July 7, 1973); American Fed'n
of Musicians Local 76 (John C. Wakely), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 80, at 3-7 (Mar. 21, 1973).
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may reduce the growing burden upon the Board, the General Counsel, and the regional offices.'"
In sum, the Collyer doctrine is founded upon firm legal ground
and sound pragmatic bases. Both the law and industrial realities
support the Board's efforts to encourage unions and employers to
settle their differences through collective bargaining and grievance
arbitration, rather than through economic warfare.

III. Collyer APPLIED
As previously shown, the Board's Collyer holding departed from
earlier precedent only to the extent that it announced for the first
time that, even in cases where an arbitral award has not issued or
the parties were not engaged in the arbitral process, the Board
would defer on a regular, rather than an ad hoc, basis if certain
conditions were met.' The majority in Collyer pointed out five factors that particularly favored deferral:9 2 (1) the dispute arose
"within the confines of a long and productive collective-bargaining
relationship;" (2) "no claim [was] made of enmity by Respondent
to employees' exercise of protected rights;" (3) the respondent
"credibly asserted its willingness to resort to arbitration;" (4) the
contract contained a "clause providing for arbitration in a very
broad range of disputes and unquestionably broad enough to embrace this dispute;" and (5) "the dispute [was] one eminently well
suited to resolution by arbitration." 3 Collyer thus seemed to establish definite criteria for deferral;94 however, the Board, by attributing greater weight to some factors than to others, has refined and
extended its arbitration deferral policies. Additionally, the Board
has deferred certain types of unfair labor practices, but not others.
Two sets of guidelines' have been issued to indicate how the
90. See Menard, supra note 84, at 143, 152; Samoff, Coping with the NLRB's Growing
Caseload, 22 LAB. L.J. 739, 743, 749-51 (1971).
91. The Board's pre-Collyer deferral policy was criticized for engendering uncertainty
about whether the Board would or would not defer to the arbitral process in cases where there
were no outstanding awards. See Office & Professional Employees Local 425 v. NLRB, 419
F.2d 314, 317-20 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dunau, supra note 71, at 62-63; Menard, supra note 84;
Note, NLRB Unfair Labor PracticeJurisdiction& Arbitration-Effect of Deferring to Arbitration Priorto Issuance of Award, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1191, 1194 (1972).
92. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842. The majority developed these factors relying on similar factors
stated in Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
93. Cf. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 142 (1969).
94. See, e.g., First Questions from Collyer, Address by Peter G. Nash before FMCSAAA Regional Conference on Labor Arbitration, Buffalo, N.Y., Oct. 15, 1971, reported in
BNA 1971 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 151, 153-56.
95. General Counsel Memorandum, "Arbitration Deferral Policy under Collyer," Feb.
9002, at
28, 1972 [hereinafter cited as 1972 Guidelines] reported in 4 CCH LAB. L. RP.
15,011 (1972); General Counsel Memorandum, "Arbitration Deferral Policy under
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Office of the General Counsel and the Board's regional offices will
apply the Board's deferral policies." These memoranda were intended primarily to inform the regional offices and the public when
deferral would be warranted and what factors would be considered
in reaching that determination. Hopefully, they will aid in understanding when a specific factual situation satisfies the requirements
for deferring to the parties' grievance-arbitration procedures. Unlike
the guidelines, however, this article will emphasize the reasons for
the development of the Board's criteria for Collyer deferrals, rather
than the application of those criteria to regional office case handling.
A.

Contract Provisions Concerning the Resolution of Disputes
It is obvious, but elemental, that there must be a collective-

bargaining agreement in existence to which the Board may contemplate deferral. Just as deferral would be inappropriate when there
is a substantial question about the existence of a contract as a
whole,9" so the Board has declined to apply Collyer to situations
where, for example, the alleged discriminatees are not covered by
any collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, in Pauley Paving Co. 8
the Board refused to defer action on a section 8(a)(1) charge since
neither the union nor the employer regarded the discharged employees as covered by the contract. Since the Collyer doctrine is predicated upon the "availability" of contractual arbitration procedures,99 the requisite basis for deferral is also absent when there is
substantial doubt about the existence of arbitration provisions at
the time the dispute arose.""
Collyer-Revised Guidelines," May 10, 1973 [hereinafter cited as 1973 Revised Guidelines]
reportedin 83 LAB. REL. REP. 41 (1973).
96. Some commentators, particularly at the 1973 American Bar Association convention,
have claimed that the memoranda propounding the guidelines are unclear. See ABA Panel
Views on Boys Markets, Collyer Rulings, supra note 14, at 357; cf. Davey, Arbitration as a
Substitute for Other Legal Remedies, 23 LAB. L.J. 595, 597 n.5 (1972).
97. See Teamsters Local 85 (Tyler Bros. Drayage Co.), 206 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at 21-23
(Oct. 30, 1973); Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94, at 6 n.2
(July 6, 1973) (J.D.); 1973 Revised Guidelines, supra note 95, at 24, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 49
(1973); cf. Seng Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (Aug. 2, 1973) (collective-bargaining representative
had been decertified).
98. 200 N.L.R.B. No. 124, at 3 (April 9, 1972), petition for enforcement filed, No. 731346 (4th Cir., Mar. 29, 1973); cf. Reapp Typographic Serv., Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 122, at 2
n.2 (July 6, 1973); Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Oct. 27, 1972), petitionsfor review
denied, Nos. 73-1002 and 72-1390 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 20, 1974). But see Urban N. Patman, Inc.,
197 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30, 1972), petition for review denied, sub nom., Provision House
Workers Local 274 v. NLRB, No. 72-2617 (9th Cir., Feb. 21, 1974).
99. See, e.g., Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 6 (Oct. 2, 1972);
Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 5, at 2 (July 31, 1972); Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1971); cf. Jemco, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (Apr. 30, 1973).
100. See Packerland Packing Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at 6 (April 25, 1973), petition
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In addition, the contract must make binding arbitration available to the charging party for resolution of the dispute underlying
the unfair labor practice charge and there can be no obstacles to a
"quick and fair" arbitral resolution of the dispute. This generalization assumes the existence of numerous criteria established by the
Board, each requiring individual exploration.
1. Requirement of "Arbitration."-The Board has refused to
defer cases unless
the applicable contract procedures provide for
"arbitration." '' The determination of what constitutes an arbitral
procedure has depended upon the criteria developed by the Board
in the Spielberg 2 area. Thus, prospective deferral has been made
to joint labor-management grievance committees 3 when the interests of the participants are not "in apparent conflict with the interests" of the employees who have filed the charges.0 4
Although it first was thought that Collyer dictated that a grievance and arbitration procedure be the "exclusive" means for settling the parties' dispute,0 5 later Board decisions have dispelled
that notion. In postulating the "basic conditions" for deferral, the
Board has declared that one criterion is whether "the disputed issues are, in fact, issues susceptible of resolution under the operation
for review filed, No. 73-1518 (7th Cir., June 13, 1973); Borden, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1170 (1972);
cf. Jemco, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 32, at 3 (Apr. 30, 1973). The Board has held that statutory
obligations to process grievances, but not contractual duties to arbitrate, survive termination
of collective-bargaining agreements. Hilton-Davis Chemical Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 241 (1970). As
shown below, the questions of the "existence" of a contract and of arbitration procedures have
appeared in the context of repudiations of collective-bargaining relationships and interference
with the use of the grievance-arbitration provisions.
101. Machinists Dist. No. 10 (Ladish Co.), 200 N.L.R.B. No. 165, at 4 n.4 (Dec. 29,
1972); cf. Mechnical Contractors Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 12 n.15 (March 1, 1973).
102. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). In such post-award cases, the
Board held that the absence of a neutral member on a bipartite grievance-adjustment panel
would not necessarily preclude deferral to the panel's decision. Modem Motor Express, Inc.,
149 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1510-12 (1964); Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 1421
n.6 (1961). As previously mentioned, however, deferral has been considered inappropriate if
all members of the bipartite panel are "arrayed in common interest against the individual
grievant." Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 514-15 (1963). See also Youngstown
Cartage Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 305, 308 n.4 (1964).
103. See Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (March 9, 1973); Teamsters Local 70
(National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 8 (July 31, 1972), enforced sub nom. Nabisco,
Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973); Great Coastal Express, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 871
(1972).
104. Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, at 3 (July 31, 1972); cf. National
Football League Management Council, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 165, at 5 (May 30, 1973) (NFL
Commissioner, the contractual arbitrator, not considered to be a "disinterested party"). See
also Jacobs Transfer, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Jan. 11, 1973).
105. In Collyer the agreement provided that all contractual disputes "shall be settled
and determined solely and exclusively by the conciliation and arbitration procedures. . ....
The Board found that the breadth of the provision demonstrated that "the parties intended
to make the grievance and arbitration machinery the exclusive forum for resolving contract
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of the grievance machinery . . . . "10Thus it is on the availability
of grievance-arbitration machinery that the Board now predicates
deferral.17 To meet that test, the adjustment procedure must encompass the dispute and the charging party must have the right to
invoke the procedure.' 5
2. Encompassment of the Dispute by the Contractual
Procedures.-Though some of the post-Collyer cases have noted
that the particular dispute was clearly arbitrable,' 9 the Board
requires for deferral merely that the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract "arguably" encompass the dispute. In Urban
N. Patman, Inc.,"' for example, the agreement expressly excluded
controversies over wages. Nevertheless, the Board held that the dispute was "arguably one of whether the contract covers the precooked: food department employees, and not of wages" and that, in
any event, an arbitrator properly could determine the arbitrability
of such a dispute."' Thus, where disputes over the interpretation,
application, or alleged breach of the contract are subject to arbitration, the Board readily will conclude that the agreement's settlement procedures encompass disputes over the enforcement, attempted enforcement, or alleged violations of any contract provision." 2 Moreover, the Board has narrowly construed grievance provisions that allegedly exclude certain subjects from arbitration or
disputes." 192 N.L.R.B. at 839. See 1972 Guidelines,supra note 95, at 10-12, 4 CCH LAB. L.
REP. 9002, at 15,019; cf. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960)
("Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all
disputes that arise under the agreement.").
106. Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972) (emphasis
added). See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 17 (July 31, 1972); 1973 Revised
Guidelines, supra note 95, at 27 n.37, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 50 n.37; cf. note 44 supra and
accompanying text.
107. See note 99 supra.
108. See 1973 Revised Guidelines, supra note 95, at 26 n.36, 83 LAB. REL. REp. at 50
n.36.
109. See, e.g., Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at 3, 5 (March 9, 1973); Joseph
T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 5 (Oct. 2, 1972). See also 1973 Revised
Guidelines, supra note 95, at 28-30 n.42, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 51.
110. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 3 (June 30, 1972).
111. Likewise, the Board has ruled that if the charging party deems the respondent's
action to be "outside" or unprotected by the contract, it should file a grievance. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, at 5 (July 31, 1972), remanded sub nom. Communications
Workers v. NLRB, No. 72-1761 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1973). In a related § 301 action filed by
the respondent employer against the union, the court of appeals regarded the same dispute
as "arguably arbitrable." Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 454 F.2d
1333, 1337 (5th Cir. 1972).
112. See, e.g., Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, at 3 (July 31, 1972); Peerless Pressed Metal
Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 5, at 2 (July 31, 1972); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at
17 (July 31, 1972); Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 2 (June 30, 1972);
Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (May 24, 1972).
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3
limit the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
That a contract may be silent with respect to disputed conduct
has not precluded the Board from deferring to arbitration under its
Collyer policy. In Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'" for example, deferral
was ordered notwithstanding the Trial Examiner's findings that the
agreement was silent on the subject of subcontracting and that the
employer, without reference to any contractual provision, had defended its unilateral subcontracting of unit work solely by claiming
its inability to perform the work.115 Where one party has negotiated
unsuccessfully for the inclusion of a particular item, the Board also
will consider issues involving that subject as encompassed within
the grievance-arbitration provisions if the contract contains a broad
"zipper" or "management prerogatives" clause."'
Furthermore, even if the arbitrability of a grievance is itself
disputed, the Board will defer resolution of that question to the
arbitrator, for "arbitrability . . . is properly determinable by an
arbitrator.""' As the Board has observed, it "has become the near
113. See, e.g., Western Elec. Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Sept. 29, 1972); Westirn Elec.
Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 45, at 18-20 (Sept. 29, 1972) (TXD), petition for review filed sub nom.
Electrical Workers Local 1974 v. NLRB, No. 72-1995 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 20, 1972). But cf.
Communications Workers Local 1197 (Western Elec. Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 45, at 9 (March
6, 1973) (JD); Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 2 (Oct. 2, 1972).
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 584-85, the Su-

preme Court held:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from
arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and
the arbitration clause quite broad.
114. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (June 26, 1972) (TXD).
115. Id. at 12. The Trial Examiner, citing Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B.
141 (1969), and Tellepsen Petro-Chem Constructors, 190 N.L.R.B. 433 (1971), recommended
dismissal. But cf. Reapp Typographic Serv., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 122, at 2 n.2 (July 6, 1973);
American Standard, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169, at 5 (July 7, 1973); Conval-Ohio Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 3-4 (March 2, 1973) (TXD) (Trial Examiner recommended that Collyer
not be applied because the deferral defense was not raised until respondent had submitted
post-hearing brief and the contract was silent on subject of alleged unilateral change). See
also Great Coastal Express, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 871 (1972) (held that an arbitrator could best
decide whether the agreement's reference to "conditions of employment" included employee
parking privileges unmentioned in contract).
116. United States Postal Serv., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Nov. 19, 1973); Radioear Corp.,
199 N.L.R.B. No. 137, at 2-3 (Oct. 30, 1972); cf. Reapp Typographic Serv., 204 N.L.R.B. No.
122, at 7 (July 6, 1973) (JD); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 837-38, 840 (1971)
(regarding the failure of the employer to secure the union's agreement on increased wage rates
for skilled maintenance employees).
117. Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 3 (June 30, 1972). See United
Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133, at 6 n.5 (July 10, 1973); cf. MacDonald Eng'r Co., 202
N.L.R.B. No. 113, at 3 (Mar. 26, 1973) (absence of specific deferral request obviated deferring
on arbitrability issue).
However, in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, at 5-6 (July 31, 1973), the
Board, recognizing that the dispute but "arguably" arose from the collective-bargaining
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universal practice under collective-bargaining agreements" to submit arbitrability issues to arbitrators."5 While in actions to compel
arbitration the courts possess authority to determine whether grievances are arguably arbitrable, it is the arbitrator's ultimate responsibility to ascertain whether a particular dispute is arbitrable under
the contract."'
3. Availability of Arbitration to ChargingParty.-Assuming
the parties have agreed upon arbitral procedures that at least arguably encompass the particular dispute, the Board then inquires
whether those procedures are available to the charging party. In this
regard, the Board has declined to defer to arbitration where "only
by ad hoc agreement of the parties" could arbitration be2 invoked
after the employer's general manager denied a grievance. 1
The cases also suggest that the Board will defer only if the
charging party or someone acting in his best interests can activate
the grievance-arbitration machinery. For example, the Collyer doctrine majority 2' in one case'22 adopted without comment an Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that deferral was inappropriate
because of the "failure of the contract to contemplate a grievance
agreement, retained jurisdiction for an added purpose-possible further consideration if the
arbitrator found the dispute not arbitrable. Cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843
(1971).
118. Norfolk, Portsmouth Wholesale Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1151
(1972). See also J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 69, at 10 (Mar. 16, 1973) (JD),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
119. In John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964), the Supreme Court
stated:
Whether or not the Union's demands have merit will be determined by the arbitrator in light of the fully developed facts. It is sufficient for present purposes that the
demands are not so plainly unreasonable that the subject matter of the dispute must
be regarded as nonarbitrable because it can be seen in advance that no award to the
Union could receive judicial sanction.
See also Operating Eng'rs Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1972);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) ("The function of the
court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration
is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract."); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
120. Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 106 n.1 (1972), enforced, 84
L.R.R.M. 2300 (10th Cir. July 12, 1973) (unpublished decision); cf. Gary-Hobart Water Corp.,
200 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 4 n.4 (Nov. 30, 1972); Western Elec. Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 49, at 2
n.3 (Sept. 28, 1972) (rejecting contention that arbitration was not obligatory because clause
provided that disputes "may be referred . . . to an arbitrator").
121. The majority consisted of Chairman Miller and Members Kennedy and Penello.
See note 14 supra.
122. Communications Workers Local 1197 (Western Elec. Co.) 202 N.L.R.B. No. 45
(May. 6, 1973).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

on behalf of the [charging] employees against their bargaining representative [the respondent]."'21 And in a later decision, 21 the
Board declined to defer action on a section 8(b) (3) complaint in part
because there was "a close question" whether the employercharging party could file grievances. 25 When, however, the grievance procedure could be invoked by someone sharing common interests with the charging party, the Board has not shied away from
28
deferring.
Generally, then, the Board has regarded arbitration as "available" where, upon exhaustion of a grievance procedure invocable by
the charging party, the charging party or employer and union representatives other than the immediate disputants could initiate arbitration proceedings.
4. Binding Characterof ArbitrationResult.-One of the prerequisites for deferral under Spielberg has been that "all parties
[have] agreed to be bound" by the arbitral award. 1 7 In
InternationalHarvester, the Board observed:
Experience
provide for
thereunder,
attainment

has demonstrated that collective-bargaining agreements that
final and binding arbitration of grievance and disputes arising
'as a substitute for industrial strife,' contribute significantly to the
of this statutory objective.l2

Since the grievance-arbitration provisions involved in Collyer stated
that the arbitrator's decision "shall be final and binding upon the
123. Id. at 9. The Judge's alternative basis for recommending against deferral-the
express contractual prohibition against the arbitrator's alteration or modification of the
agreement-would seem unsupported by the Board's contrary opinions. See note 113 supra
and accompanying text.
124. Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (July 6,1973).
125. Id. at 7. The decision not to defer turned primarily on the Board's conclusion that
the union had "in effect repudiated its obligation under [the] agreement altogether,"
thereby renouncing "the most basic of collective-bargaining principles." Id. at 6.
126. See Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 8 (July 31,
1972); L.E.M., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 8, 1972) (while charging union apparently
could not file grievances involving alleged §§ 8(a)(3) & (5) conduct, the injured employees
could); Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 3 (June 30, 1972); Norfolk, Portsmouth Wholesale Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1972); cf. Tyee Constr. Co.,
202 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Mar. 9, 1973). See also Seng Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 36, at 6 (Aug. 2,
1973); T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 174, at 20 (June 4, 1973) (JD); Jack Watkins,
G.M.C., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 6-7 (May 16, 1973) (JD); Kansas Meat Packers, 198
N.L.R.B. No. 2, at 5 (July 31, 1972) (no deferral "to an arbitral process authored, administered, and invoked entirely by parties hostile to the [charging employees'] interests").
127. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
128. 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926 (1962, (emphasis supplied), quoting United States
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578; see Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
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parties,"'' ' it was easy for the Board to conclude that the agreement
"unquestionably obligates each party to submit to arbitration any
dispute arising under the contract and binds both parties to the
result thereof."' 30 Nonetheless, the Board's decisions applying
Collyer have made it clear that deferral depends in part upon a
contractual obligation to abide by future arbitration awards or decisions. Accordingly, no deferral is made when the arbitration procedure in effect at the time of the alleged unfair labor practice does
not bind the parties to accept its result. 131 Moreover, the Board has
declined to defer to arbitration in a section 10(k) 32 proceeding partly
arbitration provibecause, unlike in Collyer, there was "no single
1 33
sion that [was] binding on all of the parties.'
The rationale behind the Board's demand that the arbitral proceedings bind all the disputants is sound.' 4 If for some reason the
arbitration award does not contractually bind a party or is inherently incapable of settling the dispute, deferral will not further the
purposes of the Act. It was upon this rationale that the Board in
Eastman Broadcasting refined the "basic conditions" for deferral
under Collyer:
(1) [Tihe disputed issues are, in fact, issues susceptible of resolution under
the operation of the grievance machinery agreed to by the parties, and (2) there
is no reason for us to believe that use of that machinery by the parties could
not or would not resolve such issues in a manner compatible with the purposes
of the Act.' 5

That the Board expects the grievance-arbitration proceedings
to put the dispute "finally at rest in a manner sufficient to effectuate the policies of the Act" '36 is reflected in its application of the
129. 192 N.L.R.B. at 839.
130. Id. at 842.
131. United States Postal Serv., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 119, at 9 (Apr. 2, 1973) (JD) (unresolved grivances could be "appealed" either to the employer's own Board of Appeals and
Review or to advisory arbitration).
132. The Board is required to conduct hearings under § 10(k) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970), in order to resolve work assignment disputes within the meaning
of § 8(b)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970), when all parties to the dispute have not
agreed to be bound by the results of a voluntary procedure for settling the dispute. See NLRB
v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971); NLRB v. Radio Eng'rs Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573
(1961).
133. Steelworkers Local 4454 (Continental Can Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 78, at 8 (Mar.
23, 1973); cf. Hutchinson Printing Pressmen (Hutchinson Publishing Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. No.
93, at 6 n.5 (Aug. 16, 1973).
134. Deferral is appropriate when "it appears reasonably probable that arbitration will
put the statutory infringement finally at rest in a manner sufficient to effectuate the policies
of the Act." Appalachian Power Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, at 12 (July 31, 1972).
135. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972).
136. Appalachian Power Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (July 31, 1972). See also National
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Spielberg criteria' 37 to arbitral awards rendered after deferral under
38
Collyer.'
B.

Circumstances Relevant to DeferralDeterminations

In determining whether deferral of an unfair labor practice
charge to the grievance-arbitration provisions of the parties' contract is appropriate, the Board considers factors other than those
bearing on the contract provisions dealing with the resolution of
disputes. These considerations, which have been refined since their
enunciation in Collyer, include obstacles to arbitral resolution of the
dispute; the relationship of the unfair labor practice charges and the
issues subject to arbitration; the respondent's "willingness" to arbitrate; the respondent's good faith in asserting that its conduct is
privileged by the contract; the respondent's enmity, if any, toward
employees' statutory rights; and the adequacy of representation afforded an individual employee in grievance-arbitration proceedings.
1. Obstacles to Quick and FairArbitral Resolution-In many
cases, the Board has stated that deferral is appropriate because the
grievance-arbitration procedure provides a "quick and fair means"
for resolution of the dispute.'39 In his Collyer dissent, Member Howard Jenkins argued that the high cost of arbitration injures small
unions and companies and that even industrial giants are dissatisfied with the sheer "bogging-down" volume of arbitration.' The
Board has yet to decline deferral where there have been such obstacles to "quick and fair" arbitration. However, partially in answer
to Member Jenkins, Chairman Miller has intimated that he personaly would urge exercise of the Board's jurisdiction
[i]f, in the future we find coming before us with regularity instances in which
the parties have not been able to make their own machinery work-if we find
that grievance and arbitration procedures become ridden with unconscionable
expense and delay-if we find that the parties abuse their own processes so as
to reach results inconsistent with our Act-[or] if any or all of these developments or others which we cannot yet foresee demonstrate that freedom
and voluntarism produce results at odds with our national policy .... 14
Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 17 (July 31, 1972).
137. See 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
138. National Radio Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (Sept. 11, 1973), denying motion for
further considerationof National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31, 1972).
139. See, e.g., Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at 5 (Mar. 9, 1973); Joseph T.
Ryerson & Sons, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 2 (Oct. 2, 1972); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B.
No. 1, at 5 (July 31, 1972); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 121, at 2 (June 21, 1972);
cf. Seng Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (Aug. 2, 1973).
140. 192 N.L.R.B. at 854-55.
141. A Case Story, Address before Conference of Western States Employer Executives,
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Absent authoritative Board precedent indicating the extent to
which delays, expenses, or backlogs in arbitration affect deferral,
the regional offices have been directed to submit to the General
Counsel for advice "cases in which a substantial claim is made that
for pragmatic, rather than formal, contractual reasons, the arbitration procedures do not in fact afford the charging party what the
Board has referred to as a 'quick and fair means' for resolving the
dispute.'1 2 As of November 1, 1973, complaint had issued in only
one otherwise deferrable case because the charging party, a labor
organization, was financially unable to pursue its contractual remedies."'
2. Probability That Arbitration Can Resolve Unfair Labor
Practice Issues.-Initially it appeared that the Collyer doctrine
would apply when the skill of an arbitrator was needed to interpret
ambiguous contract clauses."' In extending the Collyer doctrine,
however, the Board has established the proposition that deferral
depends neither upon a dispute over the meaning or application of
substantive contract terms,'4 5 nor upon a party's claim that its disPebble Beach, Calif., Aug. 27, 1971, reported in 78 LAB. REL. REP. 28, 34-35 (1971). However,
Chairman Miller also asserted that the parties to the contract, rather than the Board, should
reform any defects in their procedures. Id. at 34.
142. 1973 Revised Guidelines, supra note 95, at 32, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 53.
143. In this case, which was submitted to the Division of Advice, the employer was
charged with unlawfully suspending 3 stewards and issuing final warning letters to 30 other
employees for their participation in a walkout, which the employer considered unprotected.
The union was approximately $7,000 in debt and had previously expended some $3,500 in
arbitration over a simple discharge. Moreover, while about 5,000 of the approximately 7,000
employees in the bargaining unit were members of the union, their dues were only $1.00 per
month, and the members had recently rejected the union's proposal to increase their dues. It
was determined that the Regional Office should be authorized to issue a § 8(a)(3) complaint
because of these circumstances and since there was no evidence that the union had maintained low dues to avoid arbitration. In addition, the amount of dues levied upon the members was viewed as an internal union matter-beyond the Board's purview in the circumstances. QuarterlyReport of the General Counsel, NLRB Release No. 1230, Feb. 12, 1974, at 3-4,
reported in 85 Lab. Rel. Rep. 119, 120 (1974).
Another complaint was authorized last year upon charges alleging that an employer had
committed multiple violations of §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (5). Deferral was deemed inappropriate, primarily because the employer was considered to have rejected the statutory principles of good-faith collective bargaining and of respecting the union's rights to file grievances.
See Chase Mfg., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 13, 1972); cf. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons,
199 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (Oct. 2, 1972). One of several secondary considerations weighing against
deferral was the fact that the union could annually afford to arbitrate only 12 of the 69
grievances then pending arbitration.
144. 1972 Guidelines, supra note 95, at 2-3, 4 CCH LAB. L. REp., T 9002, at 15,015. See
also 1973 Revised Guidelines, supra note 95, at 11 n.6, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 43 n.6.
145. See, e.g., National Heat & Power Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at5 (Feb. 26, 1972);
Great Coastal Express, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 871 (1972); text accompanying notes 111-19
supra. But see Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Mar. 21, 1973), on
reconsideration,207 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (Dec. 26, 1973).
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puted conduct is privileged by the contract. "' As the Board succinctly stated in National Radio Co., "[tihe crucial determinant
is, we believe, the reasonableness of the assumption that the arbitration procedure will resolve this dispute in a manner consistent
with the standards of Spielberg."4 7
The relationship between the unfair labor practice issue and
the contractual dispute is therefore defined in terms of the
grievance-arbitration procedure's capacity to resolve the dispute.
Although the Board readily has deferred when the questions in issue
turn on the meaning or application of particular provisions of the
collective-bargaining agreement, 8 the latest cases show that deferral does not depend upon even the involvement of any substantive
clauses.' 49 Moreover, the fact that no construction of the contract
would privilege the respondent's conduct has not prevented the
Board from deferring resolution of the matter.'50 It is fully consistent
In National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 14-15 (July 31, 1972), the Board pointed
out: "Respondent's contention that our authority is improvidently invoked does not rest on
any presumed primacy of an arbitrator to interpret an ambiguous or contested contract
provision."
146. Although the Board in Schlitz stressed that there was "a substantial claim of
contract privilege", 175 N.L.R.B. at 142, the post-Collyercases have probably eliminated any
such factor as a requirement for deferral. See, e.g., Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 5, at 3 (July 31, 1972) (Although the majority described the dispute as one
involving a "good-faith disagreement between the parties concerning the interpretation of the
contract," the dissent maintained that "there is no substantial claim of contractual privilege," id. at 11.); Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14, at 17 (Mar. 24, 1972)
(where deferral was not discouraged by the Trial Examiner's characterization of the respondent's contract interpretation as "patently erroneous") (TXD).
Several decisions have suggested, however, that deferral might not be warranted if the
respondent asserts its justifications in bad faith or does not actually rely upon its asserted
justifications. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 8 (Mar. 21, 1973)
(TXD), on reconsideration, 207 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (Dec. 26, 1973); Peerless Pressed Metal
Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 5, at 3 n.1 (July 31, 1972).
147. Appalachian Power Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, at 17 (July 31, 1972). See also Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972) quoted in text accompanying note 135 supra.
148. See note 112 supra. This also has been true when the parties' resolution of the
dispute would "flesh out the bare-bones of their statutory obligations with specific ground
rules appropriate to their particular circumstances." Houston Mailers Local 36 (Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co.), 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69, at 4 (Oct. 18, 1972). See also Baltimore
Typographical Local 12 (A.S. Abell Co.), 201 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Jan. 9, 1973).
149. See text accompanying notes 110-19 supra.
150. See Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Mar. 9, 1973); Baltimore Typographical Local 12 (A.S. Abell Co.), 201 NL.R.B. No. 5 (Jan. 9, 1973); Houston Mailers Local 36
(Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.), 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Oct. 18, 1972); Peerless Pressed
Metal Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (July 31, 1972); Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B.
No. 14 (Mar. 24, 1972); Great Coastal Express, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 871 (1972); cf.
Lithographers Local 271 (U.S. Playing Card Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (June 22, 1973),
petition for enforcement filed, No. 73-1922 (6th Cir., Sept. 13, 1973).
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with the Collyer doctrine to avoid deciding the merits of such cases;
for if the respondent has no support from the contract, bargaining
history, or past practices, the probable result is simply that the
charging party will prevail in the contract procedure.
When legal issues are resolvable under grievance-arbitration
provisions, the Board usually declines to decide them, whether or
not they require contract interpretation. 5 ' Deferral has been eschewed, however, when the pertinent contract provisions establish
criteria for resolving the dispute that are inconsistent with those the
Board would'apply in determining the unfair labor practice issues.
In George Koch Sons, Inc., 5 2 for example, the Board held that the
union had violated section 8(b)(1)(B) by, inter alia, striking to protest the employer's alleged failure to pay an individual the contract
wage scale for foremen. The contract appeared to privilege the strike
if the man were an "employee" under the Act, but did not exclude
statutory "supervisors" from its coverage. Finding that an arbitrator, therefore, could not determine the individual's status, the
Board decided that he was a "supervisor" under the Act, with the
result that the work stoppage was unlawful. Hence, Koch reflects
the Board's general policy to defer to prospective grievances when
it reasonably can assume that "the arbitration procedure will resolve [the] dispute in a manner consistent with the standards of
5 As the Board has recognized in applying the Spielberg
Spielberg."'1
criteria, that assumption is absent when there is a conflict between
the contract provisions and statutory principles, or when the unfair
labor practice issue cannot be resolved by an arbitrator.5 4
When unfair labor practice charges present multiple issues, in151. See Newspaper Guild (Enterprise Publishing Co.), 201 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Feb. 12,
1973), petition for review filed, No. 73-1154 (1st Cir., June 25, 1973) (violation for requesting
discharge of employees for nonpayment of dues dependent on whether contract contained
maintenance-of-membership clause); Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168, at 14-15 (Oct.
27, 1972) (timeliness of checkoff revocation turned on effect of contract hiatus); L.E.M., 198
N.L.R.B No. 99, at 6 (Aug. 8, 1973) (contractual validity of checkoff authorizations would
resolve ultimate question in case). But cf. American Standard, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169
(June 4, 1973).
152. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Sept. 20, 1972), petitionfor enforcement filed, No. 73-1025
(Ist Cir., Feb. 14, 1973); see Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No.
94, at 7 (July 6, 1973) ("[T]here is not a sufficient identity between the issue which we are
asked to decide with respect to the strike . . . for us to apply our Collyer policy to his
matter."); B-E-C-K-Christenson-Raber-Kief & Associates, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 468 n.2 (Feb.
18, 1972).
153. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 17 (July 31, 1972).
154. See Radio Television Technical School, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 85, at 2 (Oct. 10,
1972), enforced, 488 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1973); Airco Indus. Gases-Pacific, 195 N.L.R.B. 676
(1972), and cases cited at 677 nn.6-8.
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cluding some that are not susceptible of resolution through arbitration, the Board will strive to identify and defer all questions that
can be resolved finally through recourse to the contract procedure,
while reserving for its own decision those that cannot be deferred.'"
If, however, the issues are not separable, the Board is disposed to
defer action on all issues where the arbitration of one is likely to
resolve a substantial question common to all disputed issues.'" In
National Biscuit Co.,'57 for instance, the Board deferred charges
under sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3) based on the union's threat
to fine, and actual fining of, member-drivers for defying a union
rule prohibiting cash pick-ups that the union had promulgated
unilaterally after failing to secure the employer's agreement to suspend that practice. Even though the union's threats and fining of
uncooperative members were not arbitrable under the parties' contract, the Board deferred action on all charges pending arbitration
of the question whether the parties' contract or established past
practice required the drivers to make cash pick-ups. Since, in the
Board's view, the validity of the union's conduct, both in promulgating the rule and in disciplining its members for violations, hinged
on a correct interpretation of the parties' contract, the dispute underlying the charges was considered one that could be resolved best
by an arbitrator.'5 8 On the other hand, the Board apparently will
decide inseparable issues where the common question cannot be
resolved through the parties' contract procedures. "
3. Willingness to Arbitrate the Dispute.-One of the circumstances supporting deferral in Collyer was the fact that the respondent employer had "credibly asserted its willingness to resort to
arbitration . . . ."'" The Board still considers it essential to deferral that the respondent be willing to submit all aspects of the under155. See, e.g., J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Mar. 16, 1973); Joseph T.
Ryerson & Sons, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (Oct. 2, 1972); L.E.M., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 8,
1973) (deferred issue whether employees were properly discharged, but determined their
eligibility to vote in election); Coppus Eng'r Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 595 (1972); cf. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Oct. 31, 1972) (semble); Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B.
No. 168 (Oct. 27, 1972) (part Spielberg, part Collyer disposition).
156. Cf. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 4 (Nov. 30, 1972); Eastman
Broadcasting, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972); George Koch Sons, Inc., 199
N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 9 (Sept. 20, 1972).
157. Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (July 31, 1972).
158. Id. at 10 n.8.
159. See, e.g., Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94, at
10 n.4 (July 6, 1973); Gates Rubber, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 18 (Oct. 16, 1972) (TXD),
petition for enforcement filed, No. 73-1098 (6th Cir., Jan. 30, 1973).
160. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
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lying dispute to arbitration;' 6 ' in fact, it refrained from even considering deferral in Salt River Valley Water Users' Association "because neither the Charging Party nor the Respondent desire[d]
to utilize their agreed-upon contractual grievance arbitration proce". In this connection, the
dure to resolve their dispute .. ."I"
Board's regional offices have been instructed not to defer administratively any case unless the respondent affirmatively expresses its
willingness to arbitrate.' 3 Once the respondent complies with this
requirement, the following circumstances are not deemed inconsistent with its expression of willingness:
(1) The respondent did not previously propose arbitration of the dispute or
contend that the charge should be deferred for arbitration; (2) the respondent
previously refused a demand that the dispute be submitted to arbitration; and
(3) the respondent intends to contest the arbitrability of the underlying dispute in the arbitral forum, if, upon determination that the matter is arbitrable,
the respondent is willing to submit the merits of the dispute to arbitration."'

Further, the fact that the time limitation established by the contract for filing grievances has passed will not, by itself, preclude
deferral if the respondent is willing to waive the limitation and
permit final resolution of the dispute under the contractual proce6,
dure. 1
On the other hand, a respondent may assert certain technical
defenses that evidence its unwillingness to process the dispute
through to arbitration. In Detroit Edison Co., 6' for example, the
charging party's bargaining representative had not processed his
grievance over vacation pay to arbitration before the limits for invoking the arbitral procedure had expired. The Board declined to
defer section 8(a)(1) and (3) charges based on the employer's alleged
discriminatory denial of vacation pay because the employer, far
from waiving the limitation, insisted that it would rely on untimeli161. Detroit Edison Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 2-3 (Nov. 2, 1973). See also Seng Co.,
205 N.L.R.B. No. 36, at 5 (Aug. 2, 1973); Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No.
33, at 3 (Aug. 1, 1973); Coppus Eng'r. Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 595, at 597 (1972).
162. 204 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 1 n.1 (June 12, 1973). See also Jack Watkins, G.M.C.,
203 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 5 (May 16, 1973) (JD); Gates Rubber, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 108,
at 18 (Oct. 16, 1972) (TXD).
163. 1973 Revised Guidelines at 15-19, 83 LAB. REL. REP.at 45-46; cf. Medical Manors,
Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Oct. 19, 1973), supplemented, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Nov. 6,
1973).
164. 1973 Revised Guidelines at 16, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 46.
165. See, e.g., L.E.M., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 8,1973).
166. 206 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (Nov. 2, 1973). See also Fleet Carrier Corp., 201 N.L.R.B.
No. 29 (Jan. 12, 1973) (where an alternative basis for the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation against deferral was the lapse of the time period for filing grievances through the
failure of the union business agent to institute proceedings on the charging party's behalf).
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ness as a defense to bar arbitration. Similarly, the respondent's
unwillingness to proceed to arbitration will be conclusively presumed from its intention to assert, as a defense in the arbitral
forum, that arbitration is barred by reason of the expiration of the
contract in effect when the dispute underlying the unfair labor practice charge arose."6 7 Moreover, assuming the respondent is willing to
proceed to arbitration at the time the deferral decision is made,
either by the Board or a regional office, it is clear that the respondent's asserted willingness to arbitrate the dispute must be manifest
for a reasonable period of time after deferral. Otherwise, the decision to defer will be revoked, jurisdiction will be asserted, and the
issues raised by the complaint will be adjudicated on the merits.' 8
A separate, but related, factor considered by the Board in
weighing deferral has been the timing of any contention by the
respondent that the matter should be deferred under Collyer. If
neither party wants to resolve the dispute through their grievancearbitration procedure, the Board will not reach the question of de' Likewise, if the respondent
ferral. 69
never raises a Collyer defense,
the unfair labor practice charges will be decided on their merits.,"
167. See 1973 Revised Guidelines at 15-16, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 45-46.
168. In Medical Manors, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Oct. 19, 1973), the employer's
"reluctance to proceed promptly to resolve disputes" in the grievance-arbitration procedure
gave the Board pause in considering whether to defer, but it did defer, warning the employer
against "foot-dragging" in accepting arbitration of the dispute. Id. at 5-6 n.2. After the
respondent later had insisted "on its own contractually unfounded preconditions to arbitration," the Board reasserted jurisdiction over the complaint. 206 N.L.R.B. No. 124, at 3 (Nov.
6 1973).
The requirement that the respondent evidence its willingness to arbitrate applies equally
when it is a regional office that has deferred charges administratively. Last year, for example,
a union asked the General Counsel's Office of Appeals to reconsider its upholding of a Regional Director's deferral when the employer refused to proceed to arbitration. The employer
maintained that the union, by appealing the Regional Director's deferral, had waived its right
to arbitrate alleged unilateral changes in working conditions. Rejecting that contention, the
Office of Appeals concluded that where charges have been deferred under the Collyer policy,
the respondent must for a reasonable time thereafter be willing to resolve the dispute through
the grievance-arbitration mechanism. Moreover, the union's appeal of the deferral determination was not deemed to justify the employer's unwillingness to arbitrate. Accordingly, the
Regional Director was authorized to issue a § 8(a)(5) complaint unless the employer agreed
to arbitration or the dispute was settled on its merits. This case convinced the General
Counsel that administrative deferrals by the regional offices should be appealable. Quarterly
Report of the General Counsel, NLRB Release No. 1280, Apr. 2, 1973, at 41-43, reported in
82 LAB. REL. REP. 308, 315-316 (1973).
169. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 204 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 1 n.1 (June 12, 1973).
170. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 85 L.R.R.M. 2274, 2278-79 (3d Cir. 1974);
Nedco Constr. Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at 2 (Sept. 24, 1973); Local 70, Iron Workers
(Padgett Welding, Inc.), 206 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 1-2 n.2 (Sept. 21, 1973); Association of
Motion Picture & Television Producers, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 134, at 4 (July 6, 1973);
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In Hunter Saw Division of Asko, Inc., Chairman Miller opined that
"a respondent seeking to assert this defense has the burden of
establishing it by pleading and proving facts sufficient to show the
applicability of the principles established in the Collyer line of
cases.""17 Apparently his view has prevailed among the Collyer
doctrine majority, inasmuch as the Board now requires the charged
party to plead a Collyer-type defense in its answer so that the deferral issue may be litigated before the Administrative Law Judge."'
Accordingly, the General Counsel has advised the regional offices to
oppose introduction of evidence by the respondent if it fails to present an affirmative Collyer defense in its answer to the complaint.7 3
This discussion of timing of deferral defenses has centered on
cases in which that issue was not raised during the investigation
either by the respondent or the General Counsel, or in which the
General Counsel concluded administratively that deferral under the
Board's Collyer policy was not warranted. It should be noted, however, that the regional offices have been instructed to investigate
deferral issues whether or not they are raised formally by any party.
Under presently existing procedures, the regions must first determine whether a charge sets forth an arguable violation of the Act
and then whether the dispute underlying the charge is prima facie
suitable for deferral.17 If it concludes that deferral is warranted, the
region will ascertain informally whether the respondent is willing to
arbitrate the dispute. If the respondent indicates its willingness, the
charge will be deferred pending arbitration; 75 otherwise, the region
will proceed to a full investigation and final determination on the
merits of the charge.
If the region concludes that complaint should issue, the respondent will be afforded an additional opportunity to express its willMacDonald Eng'r Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 113, at 2-3 (Mar. 26, 1973); Hunter Saw Div. of Asko,
Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 30, at 2 n.2 (Mar. 12, 1973); Gates Rubber, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No.
108, at 18 (Oct. 16, 1972) (TXD); cf. Montgomery Ward & Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 725 n.1 (Mar.
7, 1972).
171. 202 N.L.R.B. No. 30, at "2n.2 (Mar. 12, 1973); cf. Yourga Trucking Inc., 197
N.L.R.B. No. 130, at 2 (June 26, 1972) (burden is on party requesting deference to arbitral

award under Spielberg).
172. See Nugent Serv., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 14, at 7 (Nov. 9, 197.3) (JD); Mountain
State Constr. Co., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 2 (June 1, 1973) (Collyer defense first raised
in post-hearing brief); Coliseum Hosp., Inc,, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 1 n.2 (Apr. 5, 1973)

(Administrative Law Judge recommended deferral even though neither party raised or litigated issue of deferral); Conval-Ohio, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 3-4 (Mar. 2, 1973) (TXD);

cases cited in note 170 supra.But see Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 111,
at 14-16 (Oct. 16, 1973) (JD).

173. 1973 Revised Guidelines at 48, 83 LAB. REL. Rm. at 61.
174. Id. at 36-37, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 55.
175. Id. at 17-19 n.17, 37 n.62, 41-43, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 46-47 n.17, 55 n.62, 57-58.
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ingness to arbitrate the dispute. In the event that the respondent
fails to avail itself of that opportunity within seven days after notification of the region's investigative conclusions, an unfair labor practice complaint will issue and the region will urge that any future
assertion of the deferral defense be barred by reason of the respondent's failure to make timely assertion of its willingness to arbitrate. 76 The purpose of this administrative instruction, which has
not yet been considered by the Board, is to allow the Collyer policy
to operate at the regional office level as well as at the Board decisional stage of unfair labor practice proceedings. The instruction
emphasizes that the advantages of the deferral policy in minimizing
delay and alleviating the Board's caseload "can be achieved only
through administrative deferral of charges for arbitration early
enough in the proceeding to avoid the expenditure of regional office
time and resources required to determine fully the merits of a
charge, and to prepare and present the case before an administra' 77
tive law judge.'
4. Enmity Towards Statutory Rights.-Two of the five considerations that persuaded the Board to defer to arbitration in
Collyer were the parties' "long and productive collective-bargaining
relationship" and the absence of any "enmity by Respondent to
employees' exercise of protected rights.' 7 While the length of the
collective-bargaining relationship has constituted an insignificant
79
element in the formulation of the Board's Collyer deferral policy,
the quality of that relationship has remained an important determinant.
Although judging the quality of the bargaining history requires
consideration of many factors, 180 the paramount component proba176. Id. at 42-43, 48, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 58, 61.
177. Id. at 17 n.17, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 46-47 n.17.
178. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
179. The Board has declined jurisdiction over alleged unfair labor practices occurring
during initial collective-bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Champlin Petroleum Co., 201
N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Jan. 8, 1973); National Heat & Power Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Feb.
26, 1972); Coppus Eng'r Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 595 (1972).
180. Such factors include prior unfair labor practice violations and settlements, § 301
suits, strikes, lockouts, arbitration experience, and compliance with arbitral awards, NLRB
decisions, and court orders. See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133, at 7 (July
10, 1973) ("positive evidence of maturation of the collective bargaining relationship," despite
"litigious characteristics exhibited in the past," in view of recent arbitral resolution of similar
disputes); T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 174, at 20 (June 4, 1973) (JD) (refusal to
comply with prior arbitral award); Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at 6 (Mar. 9, 1973)
(JD) ("stable and productive bargaining relationship," despite 2 wildcat strikes, and "absence of a history of union animus"); Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory Technician, 197
N.L.R.B. No. 138, at 14-15 (June 26, 1972) (noncompliance with arbitration decisions).
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bly is the evidence of mutual respect for statutory rights, particularly those protected by section 7 of the Act.'"" Significant displays
of enmity towards such protected rights, whether they occurred in
the past or are the subject of the instant unfair labor practice
charges, may militate against deferral. While it is unlikely that
isolated incidents evidencing antipathy to protected rights will render deferral inappropriate,8 2 the Board generally rejects Collyer defenses when there has been a pattern of conduct hostile to employee
rights or a repudiation of collective-bargaining principles. Thus, in
Western Electric Co. the Board found that the union's "wholesale
repudiation" of the agreement on the day it was ratified amounted
to "a renunciation of the most basic of collective-bargaining principles"'' and therefore declined to defer allegations that the union
had violated section 8(b)(3) when, to force an employer to modify
the newly agreed-upon contract, it struck without proper section
8(d) notices. In another case involving charges against an employer
for committing numerous violations of sections 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and
(5), the Board disagreed with the Administrative Law Judge's deferral recommendation on the ground that the respondent's alleged
termination of the incumbent union's contract and execution of a
"sweetheart" agreement with another labor organization constituted "a complete rejection of the principles of collective bargaining
and the self-organizational rights of employees ....
"I"
In determining whether any employer enmity weighs against
deferral, the Board looks to the general quality of labormanagement relations over the duration of collective bargaining
181. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 158(a)(3) of this title.
182. Cf. Medical Manors, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Oct. 19, 1973); Todd Shipyards
Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Apr. 24, 1973); Great Coastal Express, 196 N.L.R.B. 871 (1972).
183. 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94, at 6 (July 6, 1973).
184. Mountain State Constr. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 (June 1, 1973), supplemented, 207 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Nov. 9, 1973); accord Chase Mfg. Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128
(Dec. 13, 1972); cf. United States Postal Serv., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 119, at 9 (Apr. 2, 1973)
(JD); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 20 (July 31, 1972); Quarterly Report of the
General Counsel, NLRB Release No. 1263, at 20-21 (Dec. 18, 1972), reported in BNA 1972
LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 238, 246-47. See also United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (July
10, 1973).
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between the parties. As shown below,lu particular charges alleging
specific instances of employer interference with grievance processing require separate consideration in the application of the Collyer
doctrine, even though such conduct, if violative of the Act, may in
and of itself reflect enmity towards protected rights.
5. Charges Filed by Individuals.-In developing the Collyer
doctrine, the Board has recognized that special considerations come
into play when unfair labor practice charges are filed by individuals,
usually aggrieved employees, rather than employers or labor organizations. Just as it has refused under the Spielberg criteria to accept
arbitral awards of bipartite panels that are "arrayed in common
interest against the individual grievant,1 ' 81 the Board likewise declines to defer to arbitration proceedings in which the allegedly
injured employee would not be represented adequately. This
exception to the Collyer policy was established in Kansas Meat
Packers, 7 where two employees were discharged unlawfully for
their vigorous pursuit of grievances over allegedly unsafe working
conditions. The union business agent, who had been antagonistic
toward the dischargees, not only failed to assist them in seeking
reinstatement through the grievance procedures, but also had
personally instigated their discharge. The Board held:
In our opinion, it would not be consonant with statutory policy to defer to
arbitration in this instance as the interests of the Charging Parties-the alleged discriminatees-are in apparent conflict with the interests of the Union
5
and certain of its officials, as well as with the interests of Respondent.""

The NationalRadio Co.'89 case was distinguished on the ground that
the Board's deferral of charges under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) in that
case
was predicated on [the] finding that the interests of the union and employee
therein were 'in substantial harmony' and that there was, therefore, no ground
for assuming that the employee's interests would be inadequately represented
under contractual procedures. In the instant case, conversely, the interests of
the union and employees involved are in substantial conflict and, as a result
thereof, reasonable ground exists for assuming that the latter's interests may
not be adequately represented in the arbitral process.9 0
185. See text accompanying notes 222-32 infra.
186. Roadway Express, 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 514-15 (Dec. 18, 1963); cf. Jacobs Transfer,
Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Jan. 11, 1973). See also Youngstown Cartage Co., 146 N.L.R.B.
305, 308 n.4 (1964).
187. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (July 31, 1972).

188.

Id. at 3.

189.
190.

198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (Nov. 8,1972).
Id. at 5 n.5; see National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 19 (July 31, 1972).
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The Board has followed the principles of Kansas Meat Packers
in cases alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3),191 as well as
in those alleging a union's contravention of section 8(b)(1)(A) or
8(b) (2),111 by declining deferral where the positions of the aggrieved
employee and his bargaining representative were expressly or inherently divergent. In Seng Co., 9 3 a recent extension of the Kansas
Meat principles, the Board adjudicated a complaint alleging that an
employer had discriminatorily enforced a no-solicitation and nodistribution rule by reprimanding and discharging employees in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3). Although the employees' activities
were directed at assisting their union, so that their position in
grievance-arbitration proceedings would certainly be akin to the
union's, the labor organization had been decertified as bargaining
representative. The Board concluded that its "primary motivation
in deferring to arbitration, namely, that of facilitating and fostering
an existing collective-bargaining relationship, [could not] by definition be achieved."'9 4 Even if the decertified union could have proceeded to arbitration under John Wiley v. Livingston,'9 5 the Board
was "not willing to assume, perhaps to the discriminatee's detriment, that a decertified union which has nothing to gain and economic resources to lose if it chooses to go to arbitration will pursue
the grievances of these employees and thus obtain a 'quick and fair'
resolution thereof ...
"I" Thus, while the other decisions in the
Kansas Meat line of cases stressed the actual or apparent unwilling191. See, e.g., Seatrain Terminals, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 129, at 14 (Aug. 27, 1973)
(JD); Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (Feb. 13, 1973); Fleet Carrier Corp.,
201 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (Jan. 12, 1973); cf. Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No.
111, at 16-27 (Oct. 16, 1973) (JD); Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Mar. 9, 1973)
(wherein the Board majority implicitly rejected the dissenters' contention that the employee-

charging parties would be inadequately represented in grievance proceedings and stressed
that the alleged discrimatees could, under the contract, process their own grievances to
arbitration without the union's involvement).
192.

In the pre-Kansascase of Local 573, Laborers' Int'l (F.F. Mengel Constr. Co.), 196

N.L.R.B. 440 (1972) (TXD), jurisdiction was exercised over a § 8(b)(1)(A) & (2) complaint
because the rights of the charging employees would be defeated if the employer, who was not
party to the Board proceedings, could be forced to resort to arbitration, and because the
employees' position, if they could invoke arbitration, "would have been adverse to that of the
parties to the contract." Id. 442 n.7. See also Local 207, Laborers' Int'l, 206 N.L.R.B. No.
128 (Nov. 2, 1973); Jack Watkins, G.M.C., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 6-7 (May 16, 1973) (JD)
(§§ 8(a)(1) & (3) and §§ 8(b)(1)(A) & (2)); cf. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 174,
at 20 (June 4, 1973) (wherein the Law Judge deemed Collyer inapplicable to §§ 8(a)(1) &
(3) and §§ 8(b)(1)(A) & (2) charges filed after the arbitration of the dispute).
193. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (Aug. 2, 1973).
194. Id. at 6.
195. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
196. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 36, at 6 (Aug. 2, 1973); cf. Packerland Packing Co., 203 N.L.R.B.
No. 39 (Apr. 25, 1973); Pauley Paving Co., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Dec. 12, 1972).
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ness of the bargaining representative to support the individual
charging party through the grievance-arbitration procedure, Seng
reflects the Board's understanding that some unions may simply be
unable, from a practical standpoint, to do so.
In accordance with the above-described policies, the Board's
regional offices will administratively defer charges filed by individual employees (or by someone, not party to an applicable contract,
acting on their behalf) only if certain conditions are met.' First, the
interests of the individual charging party must be in "substantial
harmony"'98 with the interests of a party to the collective-bargaining
agreement, providing that party is willing (and presumably able) to
invoke the arbitration procedure and advocate the charging party's
position before the arbitrator or arbitral panel. This requirement
corresponds with the Spielberg standard dictating that the charging
party be "adequately represented" in the arbitration proceedings as
a condition of Board deferral to a final arbitration award. 99
The second condition is that the individual charging party does
not expressly object to, or refuse to be bound by, the award."' Although an employee may be bound by the acts of his bargaining
representative, 20 ' except when the union violates its duty of fair
representation,0 2 the Spielberg standards have required that "all
197. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 32-36, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 53-55.
198. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 19 (July 31, 1972). See also Kansas
Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, at 5 n.5 (July 31, 1972).
199. Electrical Workers Local 130 (Westinghouse Elec. Co.), 200 N.L.R.B. No. 115, at
11 (Dec. 5, 1972) (TXD); accord, McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 102, at 6 (Mar.
23, 1973); Campbell Sixty Six Express, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 157, at 6 (Dec. 22, 1972)
(TXD); Electrical Workers Local 1522, 180 N.L.R.B. 131, 132 (1969); Eazor Express, Inc., 172
N.L.R.B. 1705, 1709 n.7 (1968). But see Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No.
111, at 12-14 (Oct. 16, 1973) (JD).
200. Under the 1973 Revised Guidelines on arbitration deferral, at 34, 35 n.57, 38, 83
LAB. REL. REP. at 54 & n.57, 55, 56, the NLRB regions were not to solicit the position of the
charging employee concerning his willingness to be bound by arbitration of the dispute.
Experience under those instructions revealed, however, that employees acting without assistance of counsel or a union representative have been unaware that their rejection of arbitration could preclude deferral. To correct this disparate treatment, the regional offices were
notified by a memorandum dated July 30, 1973, to advise an individual charging party,
whether or not assisted by an informed representative, that his charge will not be administratively deferred to arbitration if he specifically objects to arbitration of his case and does not
act inconsistently with that objection, such as by not filing, maintaining, or pursuing a
grievance to resolve the dispute. However, the regional office must also advise the charging
party that the Board may not defer his charge, in which event extensive time may be expended on two proceedings before his case ultimately is resolved by arbitration.
201. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964); Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962);
Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 649 (1953).
202. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962),
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Metal Workers Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool
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parties [agree] to be bound" by the arbitral proceeding." 3 The
Board has not required as a prerequisite to deferring to arbitration
awards that the aggrieved employee be a formal party to the arbitration proceeding. It is clear, however, that he must have "acquiesced
2 ' In Jacobs Transfer,205 for example, the
or participated therein.""
Trial Examiner refused to consider a bipartite committee's decision
as comporting with the Spielberg standards, partially because the
employee "did not voluntarily submit the issue to the Joint Committee, and did not agree to be bound by the award. ' '216 Since the
Board under the Collyer deferral policy ' considers whether a dispute will be resolved in conformity with the Spielberg standards, it
seems that the charging party's express or implied acquiescence in
the binding character of the arbitration result is required to defer
an individually filed charge.
C. Disputes over Special Subject Matters
Following its deferral of a section 8(a)(5) complaint in Collyer,
the Board extended its arbitration deferral policies to alleged violations of other sections of the Act. 28 Yet it has not deferred to arbitraCo.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
203. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082; see Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1053
(1960).
204. Electrical Workers Local 130 (Westinghouse Elec. Corp.), 200 N.L.R.B. No. 115,
at 11 (Dec. 5, 1972) (TXD). See also cases cited in note 199 supra.
205. 201 N.L.R.B. Nm 34 (Jan. 11, 1973) (TXD).
206. Id. at 29. The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's decision and recommendations
without modifications, although Chairman Miller opposed acceptance of the arbitration
award "solely on grounds that the Committee was arrayed in interest against the grievant."
Id. at 1 n.2. See Electrical Workers Local 130, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 115, at 11 (Dec. 5, 1972)
(TXD). In Steelworkers Local 4454 (Continental Can Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 78, at 8 (Mar.
23, 1973), the Board rejected a Collyer deferral contention in the context of a § 10(k) proceeding and asserted:
Here we have no single arbitration provision that is binding on all of the parties ...
IlImplicit within Collyer is the rationale that the Board will defer to arbitration proceedings only when, in effect, all parties involved are bound by the results of such
arbitration.
But cf. McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 102, at 7 n.5 (Mar. 23, 1973).
207. Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972); Appalachian Power Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, at 12 (July 31, 1972); National Radio Co., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 17 (July 31, 1972), motion for further considerationdenied, 205 N.L.R.B.
No. 112 (Sept. 11, 1973); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843 (1971).
208. For cases representing the Board's first decisions to defer complaints alleging
violations of § 8 of the Act see Newspaper Guild, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Feb. 12, 1973)
(§§ 8(b)(1)(A) & (2)); Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Oct. 27, 1972) (§8(a)(2));
Houston Mailers Union No. 36 (Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.), 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69
(Oct. 18, 1972) § 8(b)(1)(B)); Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 2
(Oct. 2. 1972) (§ 8(a)(1)); Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4
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tion in cases involving sections 8(b)(4), °9 8(b)(7), or 8(e).210 Moreover, certain types of unfair labor practice disputes have been considered not properly deferrable to grievance-arbitration procedures,
but appropriate for Board adjudication. These matters are summarily discussed below.
1. Accretion Cases.-Under the Collyer policy, the Board will
probably decline to defer disputes over obligations to include new
facilities or operations within an existing bargaining unit. The cases
point in that direction. In Combustion Engineering,Inc.,211 a postCollyer case, the Board refused to accept an arbitrator's decision
that certain new employees were covered by an existing contract.
The Trial Examiner found that the employer violated sections
8(a)(1) and (3) by enforcing the contract's union-security clause
with respect to those employees since they were not actually accreted to the pre-existing unit. Agreeing with that conclusion, the
Board also approved the Trial Examiner's recommendation that
deferral to the arbitral award would be inconsistent with the
Spielberg standards. The Board noted that "though the arbitrator
answered the question [whether the contract covered the employees] in the affirmative, it is nevertheless the obligation of the Board
established
to determine whether the employees at [the newly
12
plant] constituted an accretion to the existing unit.1
(July 31, 1972) (§ 8(b)(3)); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31, 1972)
( 8(a)(3)).
209. See Carpenters Dist. Council, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Mar. 26, 1973) (§ 8(b)(4)(B);
Steelworkers Local 4454 (Continental Can Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (Mar. 23, 1973)
(0 8(b)(4)(D)); Machinists Dist. 10 (Ladish Co.), 200 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (Dec. 29, 1972)
(0 8(b)(4)(D)); cf. Hutchinson Printing Pressmen (Hutchinson Publishing Co.), 205
N.L.R.B. No. 93 (Aug. 16, 1973) (§ 8(b)(4)(D)).
210. Cf. Boilermakers Local 92 (Bigge Drayage Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at 5 n.2 (June
6, 1972) (Miller, Chairman, concurring). In a recent § 8(e) case considered by the General
Counsel, it was determined that administrative deferral would be inappropriate, particularly
since the contract was allegedly unlawful.
Nor has the Board applied Collyer in any case alleging a violation of § 8(a)(4) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony" under
the Act. Thus, regional offices were recently authorized not to defer such allegations in two
cases submitted to the General Counsel for advice, since § 8(a)(4) violations involve "interference with the very statutory processes provided for correction of unfair labor practices."
Quarterly Report of the General Counsel, NLRB Release No. 1320, Feb. 12, 1974, at 2, 3,
reported in 85 Lab. Rel. Rep. 119, 120 (1974).
211. 195 N.L.R.B. 909 (1972).
212. Id.; see Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. No. 138, at 14 n.12 (Jan. 31,
1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 113, at 19-20, 30-31 (Oct. 31, 1973) (JD);
cf. Standard Scientific, 195 N.L.R.B. 995 (1972) (wherein Board adopted Trial Examiner's
conclusions that employer violated § 8(a)(2) by recognizing former representative of its
closed plant at new plant where it enjoyed no majority status and that it would be inappropriate to defer to pending arbitration over enforcement of union-security provisions in expired
contract as to new employees). See also Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 844-45
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Moreover, in Germaiitown Development Co. 2 13 the Board rejected the union's contention that it should defer action on representation and unit clarification petitions, pending arbitral resolution of
the issue whether employees working in a manufacturing plant operated by Germantown, a wholly owned subsidiary of Superior, were
accreted to the multi-employer bargaining unit to which Superior's
employees belonged. The union had filed a grievance alleging that
Superior had violated the multi-employer contract by not applying
its terms to the Germantown plant employees, whom the union
maintained were accreted to the multi-employer unit covered by the
agreement. The union's grievance was in process and an arbitrator
had been selected before Superior and Germantown filed their petitions. Accordingly, the union's argument that the Board should
defer consideration of the matter until the arbitrator ruled on the
merits of the contract interpretation question before him raised a
Dubo, rather than a Collyer, deferral issue. The Board's reasons
for rejecting the union's argument would, nonetheless, appear
applicable to the contention that the Board should defer in a similar
context under Collyer where no grievances have been filed: The
Board observed that it had "consistently held that, notwithstanding
an arbitrator's findings on matters of contract interpretation related
to accretion issues, it is the obligation of the Board to determine
whether, absent the consent of the employees, the empl6yees constitute an accretion to an existing bargaining unit."2 1
2. Requests for Information.-The Board has long held that
section 8(a)(5) obligates an employer to honor requests by its employees' collective-bargaining agent for information that is relevant
and necessary to the union's performance of its statutory duties.
This general principle, which has met with Supreme Court approval,21 5 applies both to information needed for collective bargain(1971) (concurring opinion of Member Brown, who expressed strong reservations about applying Collyer in representation area).
213. 207 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (Nov. 27, 1973).
214. Id. at 5. Champlin Petroleum Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Jan. 8, 1973), wherein the
Board deferred §§ 8(a)(1) & (3) charges to the parties' grievance-arbitration procedures, is
not to the contrary. Unlike Combustion Engineeringand Germantown, however, Champlin
involved no allegation that any employees should or should not have been accreted to an
existing unit. Rather, the gravamen of the §§ 8(a)(1) & (3) complaint was that the employer
had transferred several employees to less desirable jobs at the employer's warehouse because
of their union activities-an issue that could be decided without reference to whether the
warehouse to which the employees were assigned constituted an accretion to the existing unit.
Cf. Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30, 1972).
215. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956).
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ing and to that necessary for administering the contract, such as for
processing grievances for employees. 18
Recognizing that the duty to furnish information flows from the
Act, the Board generally has not deferred disputes concerning alleged breaches of that obligation. 217 In such circumstances, however,
the Board emphasized that the parties' contract contained no provisions referring to union requests for information. Thus, in American
Standard, Inc., the Board held:
It is now well settled that a collective bargaining representative is entitled
to information which may be relevant to its task as bargaining agent, and this
is not a matter for deferral to arbitration where, as here, the material is sought
as a statutory, rather than a contract, right. It is clear in the case before us
that there is no contract clause dealing specifically with the furnishing of
information necessary and relevant to the processing of grievance or any other
clause by which the Union waives its statutory right to such information. 2 ,

Applying the distinction between statutory and contractual rights
to information, the Board in United Aircraft219 deferred a dispute
over the employer's production of certain records and data. The
bargaining agreement required the company to provide certain materials at step 2 of a grievance proceeding, but was silent regarding any similar duty at step 1. In finding that the union's claim
to the information during the first step presented a question of
contract interpretation, the Board stated: "Whether or not this silence constitutes a waiver and whether or not the step 2 requirement mandates the production of the particular records and/or
information which the union requested are matters best resolved
2 20
by arbitration.
The deferral of section 8(a)(5) charges based on the failure to
supply relevant information raises one troublesome possibility, even
in cases such as United Aircraft, where the parties have agreed to
specific provisions governing the bargaining representative's right to
216. See note 215 supra. See also Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 721-22 (2d
Cir. 1966); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962), enforced, 325 F.2d 746 (6th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
217. See American Standard, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169, at 3-4 (June 4, 1973); UnitedCarr Tennessee, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 4-7 (Mar. 23, 1973) (JD); cf. Fawcett Printing
Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Feb. 21, 1973). In C-B Buick, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (Sept.
17, 1973), for example, the Board, without any mention of Collyer, found that an employer
had violated § 8(a)(5), under NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), by refusing to
provide the union information during contract negotiations to substantiate its claimed inability to pay more than it offered to the union.
218. 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169, at 3-14 (June 4, 1973). See also United-Carr Tennessee, 202
N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 5 (Mar. 23, 1973) (JD).
219. 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (July 10, 1973).
220. Id. at 5-6.
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obtain such information and their contract makes disputes arising
under these provisions arbitrable. If information necessary to the
processing of a particular grievance is not supplied upon request,
the bargaining representative may be forced by the grievancearbitration procedure's time limitations either to process the underlying grievance through to arbitration without relevant information
or to abandon the grievance. This result could make meaningless
the final disposition of the information issue, at least for purposes
of the underlying dispute that gave rise to the request for information. To avoid this possibility, administrative deferral under United
Aircraft will be conditioned on the respondent's commitment to
resolve the information dispute through prompt settlement in grievance negotiations or submission to arbitration before, and without
prejudice to, further processing of the underlying grievance to which
the information pertains.2'
3. Frustrationof Grievance Processing.-The Board's decision in Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc.,222 shows that deferral will
not be available when the alleged unfair labor practice, if committed, impedes access to the grievance-arbitration procedures. The
employer in Ryerson was charged with violating section 8(a)(1) by
threatening a steward with reprisal for handling a grievance that the
employer believed to be unmeritorious. Indicating several reasons
why the dispute underlying the charge was not suitable for deferral, the Board stated that the incident could not clearly "form the
basis for a grievance cognizable under the contract" and noted that
there was "no showing that an arbitrator would have authority,
under the contract, to consider or remedy company interference
with the performance of grievance functions by a grievance committeeman. ' 2 23 Most importantly, the majority reasoned:
[Tihe violation with which this Respondent is charged, if committed, strikes
at the foundation of that grievance and arbitration mechanism upon which we
have relied in the formulation of our CoUyer doctrine. If we are to foster the
national policy favoring collective bargaining and arbitration as a primary
arena for the resolution of industrial disputes, as we sought to do in Collyer,
by declining to intervene in disputes best settled elsewhere, we must assure
ourselves that those alternative procedures are not only "fair and regular" but
that they are or were open, in fact, for use by the disputants. These considerations caution against our abstention on a claim that a respondent has sought
by prohibited
means, to inhibit or preclude access to the grievance proce2
dures. 1
221. See General Counsel Memorandum to Regional Offices, dated Dec. 18, 1973,
reported in 85 Lab. Rel. Rep. 65 (1974).
222. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (Oct. 2, 1972).
223. Id. at 5.
224. Id. at 5-6.
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The Board recently reaffirmed Ryerson in North Shore Publishing Co.,25 where an employee (Kabitze), purportedly discharged for
poor work performance, actually was dismissed for filing a grievance
complaining of a prior lay-off. After reciting the above-quoted language from Ryerson, the three-member Board panel (Chairman
Miller and Members Fanning and Penello) found the complaint
inappropriate for deferral under Collyer "[f]or the reasons set forth
in Ryerson"2 6 and in view of the following circumstances:
In the instant case the complaint contains a specific allegation that Kabitze was discharged for invoking the very grievance procedure to which Respondent would have us defer. We cannot entrust such a complaint to a procedure the integrity
of which is directly challenged by the allegations of the
2
complaint itself. 2

The Board then proceeded to hold that the employer had violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) since "Kabitze's discharge was but an effectuation of the threatened reprisals, which would not, in fact, have
occurred were it not for Kabitze's filing, his refusal to drop, and the
Union's pressing of the grievance. 2 28 Thus North Shore should allay
any suspicions that Ryerson was in disrepute with the Board or that
it would not apply when the alleged interference with grievance
processing constituted actual discipline that itself could be grievable under the contract.2 2 9 Accordingly, it appears that disputes "in
which respondent [is] attempting to foreclose or frustrate resort to
the arbitration procedure" 230 remain unsuitable for deferral under
Collyer.
In Ryerson and North Shore the Board first found that the
charge on its face alleged interference with grievance processing and
then determined the merits of that allegation."' Thus, if the re225. 206 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Sept. 8,1973).
226. Id. at 4. Member Fanning agreed with the disposition of the case, but did "not
subscribe to his colleagues' views regarding Collyer, and the policy of deferral enunciated in
that and subsequent cases." Id. at n.7.
227. Id. at 4.
228. Id. at 5.
229. Cf. United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (July 10, 1973); Square D Co.,
204 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (June 14, 1973). Medical Manors, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Oct. 19,
1972), may be distinguished on the grounds that the charged interference was against a
contractual right of union representatives to visit the respondent's premises, allegedly in
violation of §§ 8(a)(5) & (1).
230. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 24, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 49.
In the second case mentioned in n.143 supra, the employer was considered to have
frustrated its employees' access to the grievance machinery, but the overall conduct of repudiating collective-bargaining principles was regarded as bringing the matter more into the
ambit of Chase Mfg., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 13, 1972). Reliance upon Ryerson,
therefore, was only supportive of the determination to refrain from administrative deferral.
231. The Board dismissed this allegation in Ryerson, but found it meritorious under
§§ 8(a)(1) & (3) in North Shore.
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gional office finds that such an allegation presents an arguable violation, it would decline to defer the charges administratively and
would determine whether complaint should issue thereon. When the
Board is confronted with such a complaint, as it was in Ryerson and
North Shore, it would, eschewing deferral, either find that the violation occurred as alleged or dismiss the charge for lack of sufficient
evidence.112 For the Board to insist upon a showing of more than an
arguable violation as a condition of not deferring under Ryerson
obviously would require a closer inquiry into the validity of the
allegation-something contrary to the Collyer concept of considering deferral before, and separately from, a determination of the
charge's merits.
4. Disputes Over Unlawful Contract Provisions.-The Board
has yet to consider application of Collyer to disputes over the interpretation or implementation of contractual provisions that are unlawful on their face. It is doubtful, however, that the Board would
be inclined to defer such matters.
Since the scope of the arbitrator's authority normally is re233
stricted to the interpretation and enforcement of the contract, he
may not add to or modify the agreement. As the arbitrator derives
his authority from the contract, he may not invalidate unlawful
provisions absent authorization from the parties. 234 In these circumstances, the Board under Spielberg would likely disregard arbitral
interpretation or enforcement of agreements that themselves are
alleged to constitute unfair labor practices, either because the arbitrator's decision is repugnant to the Act,235 or because the arbitrator
23
did not adjudicate the same issue raised in the charges.
232. Cf. Square D Co., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 14, at 2 (June 14, 1972) (where "single,
isolated" remarks pertaining to grievance processing were found not to rise "to the level of
§ 8(a)(1) violation" and, in any event, were too de minimis to warrant issuance of a remedial
order); Todd Shipyards Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 7-8 (Apr. 24, 1973) (JD) (where, in a
similar circumstance, the Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation
to defer the issue whether under the contract the allegedly threatened steward could process
grievances for employees in a different craft).
233. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
234. Compare Garment Workers' Union v. Ashland Industries, Inc., 85 L.R.R.M. 2319,
2320 (5th Cir. 1974) ("The arbitrator who derives his power solely from the contract cannot
hold that charter to be legally ineffective.") with Anna's Queen, Inc. v. Dining Room Employees Local 1, 85 L.R.R.M. 2375, 2376-7 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) ("Claims of fraud in the inducement
of the principal contract are for the arbitrator to decide where, as here, the arbitration clause
is broad enough to encompass such claims."). For a discussion and review of the continuing
controversy over whether public law should be included within an arbitrator's purview see

Sovern, When Should ArbitratorsFollow Federal Law? in

ARBITRATION AND THE EXPANDING
ROLE OF NEUTRALs 29 (Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the National

Academy of Arbitrators, 1970).
235. Cf. Standard Scientific, 195 N.L.R.B. 995 (1972).
236. Cf. Airco Indus. Gases-Pacific, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
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For similar reasons, deference to prospective grievancearbitration proceedings to enforce contractual provisions that are
unlawful per se would not further the policies of the Act, unless it
is demonstrated that the arbitrator has authority to apply NLRA
principles and, if appropriate, to void the disputed term. Support
for this proposition is found in George Koch Sons, Inc.,27 where the
Board resisted deferral because an arbitrator could have construed
the contract to privilege acts by the respondent union that violated
section 8(b)(1)(B). Moreover, in the only section 8(e)2 3 8 case to present a Collyer issue, Bigge Drayage,238 the Board accepted the Trial
Examiner's recommendation not to defer a dispute over the unlawful enforcement of an ambiguous hot cargo agreement. Looking to
extrinsic evidence, the Examiner found that the parties' bipartite
grievance committee had issued a binding interpretation of the disputed clause, holding it applicable to an "off-site" location.240 Although the Board majority did not comment on the Trial Examiner's rejection of the Collyer defense, Chairman Miller, concurring,
gave this reason for opposing deferral:
Although I agree with the Trial Examiner that we should not defer to such an
award [of the joint panel], I reach that conclusion solely because that award
is the conduct which gave rise to the violation alleged and found herein. As
an interpretation of the agreement, the award was a part thereof. Far from
resolving an unfair labor practice issue, the determination gave rise to the
unfair labor practice. In these circumstances, the joint panel proceeding can
in no sense be regarded as an alternative forum for resolving issues appropriate
for Board determination. 2 '

Chairman Miller's comments thus leave open the possibility
that he would vote to defer in future section 8(e) cases if it is the
237.

199 N.L.R.B. No. 26, at 8-9 (Sept. 20, 1972). See text accompanying note 152

supra.

238. National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970) (prohibits socalled "hot cargo" agreements). In Carpenters Dist. Council (Astrodomain Corp.), 202
N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Mar. 26, 1973), the Administrative Law Judge found it unnecessary to
defer the issue whether a company was a "primary" or a "secondary" employer, since the
respondent's demands upon the company were not coercive within the meaning of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii). Id. at 7-8 (JD). The Board simply stated that since it agreed the complaint
should be dismissed, no consideration of the Collyer question was required. Id. at 1 n.1.
239. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (June 6, 1972).
240. Id. at 9, 15-16 (TXD). The construction industry provision to § 8(e) privileges "hot
cargo" agreements that would otherwise contravene § 8(e) as long as they relate "to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration,
painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work" (emphasis supplied). See National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 638-39 (1967); Teamsters Local 294 (Island
Dock Lumber, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 484, 490-92 (1963), enforced, 342 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1965);
Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 984-89
(1962).
241. Boilermakers Local 92 (Bigge Drayage Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at 5 n.2 (June
6, 1972) (Miller, Chairman, concurring); cf. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B. No.
1, at 12 (Mar. 1, 1973) (TXD). See also Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 520 (1951).
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hot cargo provision itself, rather than its interpretation, that
"[gives] rise to the unfair labor practice. 2 4 2 On the other hand,
neither Bigge nor any other case supports such an inference. Moreover, the Board has in the past secured preliminary injunctions
against arbitration of allegedly illegal hot cargo clauses,2 43 in circumstances where the violation of section 8(e) would turn on the
questionable agreements themselves, rather than on their implementation.
5. Disputes over Future Rights, Negotiability, and Unit
Elimination.-In Collyer, Member Brown expressed reservations
about deferring disputes over the "acquisition of rights in the future"-that is, through negotiations-for he did not approve of arbitration as replacing the parties in collective bargaining.2 4 The former Board Member set forth a significant condition for deferral:
[Tihe Board should assure itself that the requested deferral to arbitration
encompasses matters which have been subjected to collective bargaining. The
by the contract, and
Board should not defer where the dispute is not2 covered
5
therefore, involves the acquisition of new rights. 1

Member Brown's philosophy seems to have been adopted by the
Collyer doctrine majority. As previously mentioned, the Board has
not deferred any case where there is substantial doubt concerning
the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement at the time the
alleged unfair labor practices arose; 2 6 where the dispute essentially
involves recognition of a union;2 7 or where the controversy is over
repudiation of an entire contract.248 In none of these cases were there
conflicts over acquired rights that could be "covered by the contract."
The Board's reluctance to defer action on alleged unfair labor
practices arising out of a party's attempted acquisition of new rights
in collective bargaining was demonstrated in Mechanical Contrac242. Boilermakers Local 92 (Bigge Drayage Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at 5 n.2 (June
6,1972) (Miller, Chairman, concurring).
243. E.g., Retail Clerks Union v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525, 531-32
(9th Cir. 1965); McLeod v. AFTRA, N.Y. Council, 234 F. Supp. 832, 841-42 (S.D.N.Y.1964),
afJ'd mem., 351 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1965).
244. 192 N.L.R.B. at 845 (concurring opinion).
245. Id. See his quotation from Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945),
wherein the Court distinguished disputes over "acquisition of rights for the future" from
grievances over "vested" rights. Id. at 844-45.
246. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
247. See Mountain State Constr. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (June 1, 1973); Chase Mfg.,
Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 13, 1972); cf. United States Postal Serv., 202 N.L.R.B. No.
119, at 9 (Apr. 2, 1973) (JD).
248. See Communication Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (July 6,
1973).
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tors Association."' There the complaint charged an employer association with bargaining in bad faith due to its insistence upon a
contractual provision that required it and the union to submit differences over economic matters to an Industrial Relations Council
(IRC) for determination. Notwithstanding the inclusion of the IRC
clause in previous agreements, the union wanted it deleted from the
new contract. Refusing to accede to the union's demand, the association submitted to the IRC itself the question, inter alia, whether
the IRC clause should be continued in the parties' agreement. Although the Board dismissed the case on its merits"' without any
discussion of Collyer, Member Fanning, dissenting, pointed out that
the majority apparently agreed with the Administrative Law Judge
that the case should not be deferred. Speculating about the rationale behind that silent affirmation, he noted that while the contract
contained a grievance procedure, "the first step in that process is
the submission of the grievance to the Council itself for what I
presume my colleagues view as the negotiation of a settlement."'
It is unclear whether deferral would be appropriate where the
employer has totally or substantially eliminated the bargaining
unit. Yet the same considerations that led the Board to refuse deferral of disputes regarding the establishment of contract terms or the
repudiation of an entire contract would require that disputes concerning the partial or total elimination of the unit be decided by the
Board instead of an arbitrator. In particular, the rejection of collective bargaining inherent in such conduct would seem to weigh
against deferral. Although the Board has not specifically addressed
itself to this problem, it has decided cases involving alleged refusals
to bargain over plant closings or removals since Collyer was handed
down.

252

249. 202 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (March 1, 1973).
250. The IRC was found not to constitute an arbitration panel, but "an extension of
the collective-bargaining process by a different set of negotiators." Id. at 5. By referring the
dispute to the Council, the respondent was not conditioning agreement upon inclusion of the
IRC clause; rather, it was referring that issue to the next level of bargaining. Id. at 8.
251. Id. at 12 n.15 (dissenting opinion).
The 1971 National Agreement between the U.S. Postal Service and 4 union signatories
provided for local negotiations to implement that contract. Impasses arising in local bargaining were transmitted to regional impasse panels and thereafter, if disputes persisted, to a
national impasse panel for resolution. Disputes over local issues could then be referred to
arbitration. Hundreds of § 8(a) (5) charges arose from those local negotiations. Although some
questions, such as the scope of the local negotiators' authority, were administrativbly deferred
under Collyer and Dubo, deferral was made to the contractual grievance arbitration procedure, not to the impasse proceedings, which essentially culminated in interest arbitration.
252. See, e.g., Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972), enforced, 83 L.R.R.M.
2044 (7th Cir. 1973) (wherein the court impliedly rejected employer's argument on appeal that
the Board should have deferred under Collyer).
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D. Interrelationshipof Collyer and Dubo Policies
Analytically, the Collyer and Dubo policies are similar. Both
depend upon the existence of final and binding arbitration as the
terminal point of an agreed-upon grievance procedure; each generally applies when the dispute can be settled through an arbitral
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement; and, after deferral under either policy, the Board will examine the arbitrator's
decision to determine if the Spielberg tests are met. In addition,
former General Counsel Arnold Ordman characterized the Dubo
practice as one of deferring action on a charge when the "grievancearbitration procedure is being actively pursued . . . if it appears
that there is a substantial likelihood that the utilization of the procedure will set the dispute at rest." '53 A comparable test for the
Collyer doctrine expressed in Eastman Broadcastingis that the disputed issues must be "susceptible of resolution under the operation
'
of the grievance machinery."254
To be sure, Dubo operates when the parties are pursuing arbitration actively, while Collyer deferrals are predominantly prospective, operating before either party has invoked the grievance
procedure. A more fundamental difference lies in the rationale underlying the two policies. Like Spielberg, Dubo was based essentially upon the Board's reluctance to allow the parties to use two
forums simultaneously to resolve their dispute."5 The Collyer doctrine not only incorporates this concern," 6 but goes further. Its philosophy is freedom of contract 25 -to encourage the disputants to
utilize their agreed-upon procedures so long as the unfair labor practice issues are reasonably susceptible of resolution thereunder and
the arbitral decision would not be repugnant to the policies of the
Act. Unlike Dubo, under which deferral is based upon the parties'
current utilization of existing grievance-arbitration procedures,
253. Ordman, Arbitrationand the NLRB-A Second Look, Speech before the National
Academy of Arbitrators, San Francisco, Mar. 3, 1967, reported in 1967 BNA LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK

197, 202.

254. 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972).
255. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 432; cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70
N.L.R.B. 500, 501 (1946). See also Theodore P. Mansour, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 29, at 4-7 (Sept.
22, 1972) (TXD).
256. As Chairman Miller asserted in his speech, Little Collyer Grows Up, supra note
13:
If there is one thing which all of you who work in this field know, it is that if our
system of free collective bargaining is to survive, it is vital that such [labor relations]
disputes be settled promptly and without long and legalistic litigation.
257. See Atlantic Richfield Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at 3 (Oct. 31, 1972).
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Collyer calls for them to resort to those procedures. The lesson of
Collyer, therefore, is that the parties can and should engage in good
faith collective bargaining by adhering to their agreements, including those to arbitrate grievances encompassed by the contract's procedures.
As the Board has expanded its Collyer doctrine, it correspondingly has narrowed the applicability of Dubo. For instance, the
Board has applied Collyer, rather than Dubo, not only when the
parties are proceeding voluntarily to arbitration of their dispute,28
but also when a court injunction orders the submission of a grievance to arbitration, as was the situation in Dubo itself."' Accordingly, it appears that the Board will examine deferral prospects
under Collyer before considering a Dubo disposition. For this reason, regional offices now consider deferral under the Collyer doctrine
prior to determining whether the Dubo policy is applicable.2 60 Even
if conditions for Collyer deferral are absent, the complaint may still
be deferred administratively under Dubo.2 6 Deferral may be warranted, for example, where the contract's grievance procedures do
not encompass the dispute in question, but the parties have entered
into an ad hoc agreement to arbitrate the particular dispute,262 or
where a pattern of employer enmity towards statutory rights precludes deferral under Collyer, but the union willingly processes the
2
dispute to arbitration. 1
IV.

IMPACT

OF Collyer UPON NLRB PRACTICE

The preceding discussion has dealt with the theoretical bases
258. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (July 31, 1972), 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112
(Sept. 11, 1973) (Arbitration proceedings, which had been scheduled before the complaint was
issued, were conducted before the Board hearing, but were continued by Arbitrator Archibald
Cox, pending the Board's decision; after initially deferring under Collyer, the Board examined
and accepted the arbitrator's decision as conforming to Spielberg); Coppus Eng'r Corp., 195
N.L.R.B. 595, 597 (1972) (grievance discussions pending at time of Board hearing). But cf.
Titus-Will Ford Sales, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 2 (May 26, 1972) (wherein Board noted
union had abandoned previously filed grievances and concluded Collyer applied).
259. Medical Manors, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 5 (Oct. 19, 1972); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (July 31, 1972). In Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168
(Oct. 27, 1972), the union obtained a federal court order compelling the employer to arbitrate
the dispute, but withdrew one aspect of the dispute from arbitration. The Board, while
recognizing the arbitrator's decision under Spielberg, deferred the withdrawn grievance under
Collyer.
260. Cf. George Koch Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Sept. 20, 1972) (wherein Board,
citing only Collyer, found deferral inappropriate since arbitrator could not resolve the statu-tory question involved in pending grievance-arbitration proceedings).
261. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 38, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 56 (1973). See also 1972
Guidelines, at 17, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP., 9002, at 15,022.
262. See Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 106 n.1 (1972).
263. But cf. United Aircraft Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. 633 n.1 (1971) (wherein employer
unsuccessfully pressed arbitration against union's objections).
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of the Coliyer decision and the development of the Board's deferral
doctrine. But the Collyer policy is no mere abstraction; indeed, it
has made a practical impact upon the Board's case handling procedures and perhaps upon private collective-bargaining relationships.
This is not the place to speculate how, if at all, Collyer has influenced the negotiation of bargaining agreements.264 It is not premature, however, to comment briefly on some of the more important
changes in Board practice that have resulted from the Collyer decision.
A.

Timing of Administrative Deferral

The Board's processes interact, sometimes abrasively, with private procedures for settling labor relations disputes. Collyer has
relieved some of this friction by enabling parties in many cases to
resolve their contractual differences through recourse to agreedupon methods of adjustment. At least one commentator has suggested, however, that arbitral hearings may be prejudiced by a regional office's administrative determination that an unfair labor
practice charge is meritorious and that complaint is warranted.265
This admonition is valid to the extent that it relates to charges that
are deferrable under the Collyer policy. Procedures have been developed, however, to minimize the danger that administrative handling of deferrable charges would adversely affect arbitration proceedings.266
Since the Collyer policy presupposes deferral of only arguably
meritorious charges, plainly unmeritorious charges plainly are subject to dismissal. 267 To avoid an adverse impact on the arbitral
264. In their dissent in National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 28 (July 31, 1972),
Members Fanning and Jenkins warned of contractual clauses that could subject unfair labor
practice issues to deferral under Colyer and thereby deter the Board from deciding such

issues:
A further and necessary result [of the deferral policy] is that if the parties desire,
they may contract themselves out of the Act to any extent they choose by listing in the
contract the provisions of the Act they agree not to violate, and appending an arbitration
clause to such listing.
See aLso Address by Patrick O'Donoghue, A.B.A. Convention, Washington, D.C., Aug. 7,
1973, reported in 83 LAB. REL. REP. 355, 356 (1973).
265. Address by Evan J. Spelfogel, A.B.A. Convention, Washington, D.C., Aug. 7,1973,
reported in 83 LAB. REL. REP. 355, 356 (1973).
266. See 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 37, 41, 47, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 55, 57-60 (1973).
Under the 1972 Guidelines, at 17, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 9002, at 15,022 (1972), the regions
would consider deferral only after the charges were fully investigated and issuance of a
complaint was deemed warranted.
267. The Board has dismissed in their entirety complaints alleging what it deemed de
minimis violations, without even considering whether the matters were otherwise deferrable.
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hearing, however, the regional offices have been instructed to inquire only whether the charges are frivolous or clearly lacking in
merit. Assuming the charge is not dismissed under this standard,
the region will determine whether the charge may be deferred to
the parties' grievance-arbitration machinery. " 8 If the respondent
expresses its willingness to arbitrate the dispute underlying the
charge at this stage of the investigation, the matter will be deferred
without further investigation or a final administrative determination that the charge is meritorious.2 69 The region will proceed to
determine whether complaint is warranted only if the respondent
declines to express a willingness to arbitrate. 0 Accordingly, deferral
at the earlier stage means merely that the charge is not patently
unmeritorious, not that it has merit.
B.

Post-DeferralProcedures

As discussed above,271 the Board retains jurisdiction over deferred cases
for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further
consideration upon a proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with
reasonable promptness after the issuance of [the] decision, either been resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted
promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not
been fair and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act.",
See Square D Co., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 14, at 2 (June 14, 1973); American Fed'n of Musicians
(John C. Wakely), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (March 21, 1973); San-Tul Hotel Co., 198 N.L.R.B.
No. 86 (July 27, 1972); cf. National Football League Management Council, 203 N.L.R.B. No.
165, at 7 n.5 (May 30, 1973), where the Board stated:
Since we find that Respondent's course of conduct [as to bargaining over the use of
artificial turf] did not reach the point of maturing into even a prima facie breach of
either contractual or statutory duties, we need not and do not decide whether, had such
a prima facie case been made out, we would have withheld our processes pending a •
resolution of the dispute under the contract's grievance and arbitration procedures.
268. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 36-37, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 55 (1973); see text accompanying notes 174-77 supra.
269. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 18-19 n.17, 37 n.62, 41-42 n.68, 83 LAB. REL. REp. at
46-47 n.17, 55 n.62, 57 n.68 (1973).
270. Id. at 41-42, 53-54, 83 LAB. REL. REp. at 57-58, 64 (1973).
271. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
272. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 21 (July 31, 1972); Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843 (1971). See also Great Scott Supermarkets, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B.
No. 111, at 31 (Oct. 16, 1973) (wherein Board adopted without comment Administrative Law
Judge's recommendation that jurisdiction should be reasserted if charging party could show
also that "the decision of arbitrator is not wholly dispositive of the issue in [the] case.");
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, at 5-6 (July 31, 1972) (wherein Board held
it would reconsider case upon additional showing that arbitrator found dispute not arbitrable).
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The first of these two grounds on which the Board will entertain a
motion for reconsideration was made clear in Medical Manors, Inc.,
where the Board, in ordering deferral, first cautioned the respondent
against "further foot-dragging in such manner that the disputes in
issue are not promptly submitted to arbitration,"2 '3 and thereafter
reasserted jurisdiction when the respondent delayed arbitration of
25
the matter. " 4 The Board's second decision in National Radio Co.

1

suggests how it will deal with motions urging the second ground for
reconsideration-unfairness or irregularity in the arbitral procedures or repugnancy in the final arbitral result.
NationalRadio confirmed that the Board would indeed scrutinize arbitrator's awards in light of Spielberg. While no party contended that the arbitral proceeding was unfair or irregular, the
charging party raised the Spielberg issue whether the award was
repugnant to the Act by failing "to dispose of all the statutory issues
raised by the complaint. '26 The union conceded at the outset that
the arbitrator had considered and answered the question whether
the employer's acts of disciplining and discharging the union's representative were based upon anti-union animus. It maintained,
however, that the arbitrator had not passed on the section 8(a)(5)
allegation that the employer unlawfully had promulgated a rule
requiring union representatives to report their movements in the
plant while processing grievances on compensated time. For his
alleged refusal.to obey this rule, the dischargee was fired. The Board
majority responded to the union's contention by pointing out (1)
that the arbitration proceeding did resolve the "basic underlying
issue" and (2) that "the Charging Party initially did not ask [the
arbitrator] to resolve the issue of the propriety of the manner in
which the rule had been promulgated in the arbitration and subsequently did not avail itself of the unopposed opportunity to expand
the scope of the arbitration procedures to include that issue.""
The Board's third reason for denying the union's motion in
273.
274.

199 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 5 (Oct. 19, 1972).
206 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Nov. 6, 1973). In cases where the charges are administra-

tively deferred, the regions will revoke deferral and resume processing the charges if the
respondent prevents or impedes the prompt resolution of the dispute through grievancearbitration procedures. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 46-47, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 60 (1973).
275. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (Sept. 11, 1973).
276. Id. at 2. See also Airco Indus. Gases-Pacific, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
277. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 3-4 (Sept. 11, 1973); cf. Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B.
No, 168, at 14 (Oct. 27, 1972) (wherein Board deferred under Collyer an issue withdrawn from
arbitration by union).
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NationalRadio supplied an additional facet to its post-deferral policies:
[A]t no time prior to the issuance of the [arbitrator's] award did the Board
receive a timely motion from the Charging Party that any issue as to the
propriety of the rule or the nature of its promulgation had not been resolved
by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or had not been submitted
to arbitration."n

The National Radio case, then, clarifies what the Board will consider a "timely motion." If a charging party has reason to believe
that the arbitration proceedings to which the Board has deferred
will not encompass a significant issue raised in the unfair labor
practice complaint, it should apprise the Board of the fact as soon
as it is discovered. Although the union in National Radio filed its
motion for reconsideration only one month after the arbitrator's
decision,ns the motion was not timely in view of the purpose for
which it was made. It might be noted that the General Counsel's
administrative deferral guidelines provide for regional office inquiries into the status of deferred disputes at least every 90 days.,"
Moreover, the parties at any time may, with or without such inquiry, submit evidence in support of requests for dismissal, continued deferral, or issuance of complaint.2'
C. Noncompliance With the Arbitral Award
The Board's post-award deferral policy was enunciated and
developed in cases where the charging party's claim was first rejected in the arbitral forum."' 2 In Malrite of Wisconsin,"3 on the
other hand, the Board faced the question whether to issue a remedial order where the charging party had prevailed in arbitration, but
the respondent had failed to comply with the arbitrator's decision.
Agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the
award satisfied the Spielberg criteria, the Board nonetheless rejected his recommendation that an order issue against the respondent employer. The Board's rationale, in disclaiming responsibility
for enforcing arbitration awards, was unequivocal:
278.

205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 4 (Sept. 11, 1973) (footnote omitted). After deferring in

Champlin Petroleum Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Jan. 8, 1973), the Board later granted the
General Counsel's Motion to Approve Withdrawal Request and Close Case, since the parties
had amicably settled their dispute. (Order dated October 2, 1973).
279. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 1-2 (Sept. 11, 1973).
280. 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 45, 46, 55, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 59, 60, 65 (1973).
281. Id.
282.
283.

E.g., Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
198 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (July 18, 1972), petitionfor review filed, No. 72-1996 (D.C. Cir.,

Oct. 20, 1972).
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In its formulation of the Spielberg standards the Board did not contemplate its assumption of the functions of a tribunal for the determination of
arbitration appeals and the enforcement of arbitration awards. If the Board's
deference to arbitration is to be meaningful it must encompass the entire
arbitration process, including the enforcement of arbitral awards. It appears
that the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes through the arbitration process will best be served by requiring that
parties to a dispute, after electing to resort to arbitration, proceed to the usual
conclusion of that process-judicial enforcement-rather than permitting
them to invoke the intervention of the Board. 4

Although Malrite did not involve a dispute that the Board had
previously deferred, its impact upon such cases is clear. Where an
arbitration award that satisfies the Spielberg criteria is issued after
deferral by the Board or by its regional offices, the deferred charges
2
will be dismissed. &5
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Collyer decision exemplifies the Board's "hospitable acceptance"2 6 of arbitration as a means of adjusting disputes between
parties to collective-bargaining agreements. The Board has long de-

ferred resolution of contractual issues to arbitration, either when an
arbitration is pending 7 or when an arbitrator has adjudicated a
grievance that presents the same issues as the unfair labor practice
charges." Collyer was not the first Board decision to defer prospec-

tively to a grievance-arbitration procedure that had not been i]yoked by the parties,2 but the Board's previous recognition of the
value of arbitration does not detract from the importance of the
Collyer policy. For, as the Collyer majority recognized, the decision
represented a "developmental step" 290 in the Board's treatment of
284. Id. at 4. An arbitration award was issued after the Board had deferred action in
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (July 31, 1972), and after the charging party,
the Communications Workers, had petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review the NLRB order. Thereupon, the CWA moved the court to remand the record
to the Board for a Spielberg review. On November 23, 1973, the court in a per curiam order
dismissed the petition for review and remanded the matter to the Board for consideration of
the arbitral award in light of the Spielberg standards. Communications Workers v. N.L.R.B.,
No. 72-1761 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1973).
285. See 1973 Revised Guidelines, at 47, 83 LAB. REL. REP. at 61 (1973).
286. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962).
287. See Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
288. See Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1961); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
289. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing'Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969); Montgomery Ward &
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418 (1962); United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft
Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
290. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
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unfair labor practice cases whose resolution involves interpretation
of the disputants' collective-bargaining agreement. There, for the
first time,, the Board promulgated specific criteria which, if met,
would cause it to abstain from deciding certain kinds of cases in
deference to the parties' grievance-arbitration procedures. Later
cases refining the Collyer deferral doctrine have stressed the necessity of some of these criteria, while relegating others to scondary
importance. Thus deferral is appropriate where the following prerequisites are satisfied:
1. A collective-bargaining" agreement and its grievancearbitration provisions must have been in existence when the dispute
arose.29
2. That agreement must contain a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.292
3. The grievance-arbitration procedure must be available to
the charging party or someone willing and able to process a griev2
ance compatibly with his interests. 1

4. The grievance-arbitration procedure must arguably encompass the particular dispute that is the subject of the unfair labor
practice charges. 2 4
5. The respondent must be willing to accept arbitration by
waiving whatever procedural defenses are at its disposal, other than
the question of arbitrability.295
6. There should be no obstacles to a quick and fair arbitral
resolution of the dispute. 5
7. The parties' relationship should be free of substantial en291. See Teamsters Local 85 (Tyler Bros. Drayage Co.), 206 N.L.R.B. No. 59, at 21-23
(Oct. 30, 1973) (JD); Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94,
at 6 n.2 (July 6, 1973); Pauley Paving Co., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Dec. 12, 1972); text
accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
292. See Steelworkers Local 4454 (Continental Can Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 78, at 8
(Mar. 23, 1973); Machinists Dist. 10 (Ladish Co.), 200 N.L.R.B. No. 165, at 4 n.4 (Dec. 29,
1972); text accompanying notes 101, 127-37 supra.293. See Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94, at 7 (July
6, 1973); L.E.M., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 4, 1972); Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 198
N.L.R.B. No. 5, at 2 (July 31, 1972); text accompanying notes 120-26 supra.
294. See Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 3 (June 30, 1972); Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (June 21, 1972); text accompanying notes 109-19 supra.
295. Detroit Edison Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 2-3 (Nov. 2, 1973). See Medical
Manors, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (Nov. 6, 1973); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 204
N.L.R.B. No. 26, at n.1 (June 12, 1973); Coppus Eng'r Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 595, 597 (1972);
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971); text accompanying notes 160-77 supra;
cf. Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30, 1972); Norfolk, Portsmouth
Wholesale Beer Distrib., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (May 19, 1972).
296. See text accompanying notes 139-41 supra.
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mity towards the exercise of statutorily protected rights.29 '
8. The unfair labor practice with which the respondent is
charged must not, if committed, "inhibit or preclude access to the
grievance procedures."2' 9 8
9. Where the charge is filed by an individual employee, he
must be adequately represented in the grievance and arbitration
2
proceedings. 1
The post-Collyer cases also indicate that the Board's deferral
policy does not require that the dispute call for special skills of an
arbitrator;3 ® that there be a "substantial claim of contractual privilege"; 3"' that a grievance-arbitration procedure be the "exclusive"
means for settling disputes;" ' or that the parties have enjoyed a
particularly long bargaining history. 3 On the other hand, the
Board, in developing its arbitration deferral doctrine, has been disinclined to defer certain kinds of allegations, such as those involving
unit determination problems;3 failure to comply with statutory (as
opposed to contractual) obligations to furnish information; 35 unlawful contract provisions; 35 or the acquisition of future contractual
rights.3 7
297. See Communications Workers (Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (July 6,
1973); Chase Mfg. Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (Dec. 13, 1972); text accompanying notes 17884 supra; cf. United Aircraft Corp.; 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133, at 7 (July 10, 1973).
298. North Shore Publishing Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 7, at 4 (Sept. 18, 1973); Joseph T.
Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 6 (Oct. 2, 1972).
299. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, at 19 (July 31, 1972); Kansas Meat
Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, at 3, 5 n.5 (July 31, 1972). See also Seng Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No.
36 (Aug. 2, 1973); text accompanying notes 186-96 supra.
300. See National Heat & Power Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 5 (Feb. 26, 1973); text
accompanying notes 144-47 supra.
301. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 142 (1969). See Tyee Constr. Co.,
202 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Mar. 9, 1973); Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 5, at 3
(July 31, 1972); Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (May 24, 1972); text accompanying notes 110-16 supra.
302. See Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at 12 (Sept. 29, 1972); text
accompanying notes 105-08 supra.
303. See National Heat & Power Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Feb. 26,1973); Champlin
Petroleum Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at 16 (Jan. 8, 1973) (TXD); text accompanying notes
178-80 supra.
304. See Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 909 (1972); Standard Scientific, 195
N.L.R.B. 995 (1972); text accompanying notes 211-14 supra.
305. Compare American Standard, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (June 4, 1973), with
United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 133, tt 5-6 (July 10, 1973). See also text accompanying notes 215-21 supra.
306. Cf. Boilermakers Local 92 (Bigge Drayage Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (June 6,
1972). See text accompanying notes 233-43 supra.
307. See Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (Mar. 1, 1973); Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 844-45 (1971) (Brown, Member, concurring); text accompanying notes 244-52 supra.
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While the Collyer policy remains somewhat controversial despite its application for over two years, the Board's deferral philosophy seems to stand on firm legal and practical footing. The Board
has the discretion under the NLRA to abstain from deciding cases
08
where adjudication would not effectuate the policies of the Act,
3 9 declares that the parties' own
and section 203(d) of the LMRA
agreed-upon procedures constitute the desirable method for adjusting contractual disputes. Support for the Board's deferral policies
can be found in the Supreme Court's "hospitable acceptance" of
3'
arbitration as an informal means of dispute resolution, as well as
in those court decisions upholding the Board's application of its
31
It is significant, moreSpielberg criteria to arbitration awards".
over, that the Board's. Collyer policy was approved by the District
of Columbia, Second, and Ninth Circuits in the only prospectively
cases, as of this writing, to be ruled upon by appellate
deferred
31 2
courts.
The rationale underlying the Collyer doctrine, as amplified by
the Board, is simple and direct. As Chairman Miller has pointed
out, the policy is intended to allow parties who have established an
effective forum of their own for the resolution of disputes to resort
to it for settling their own problems. 31 3 And by leaving the parties
to their own devices, the Board promotes compliance with written
agreements which, in turn, encourages good-faith collective bargaining. The parties' progress will be monitored at ninety-day intervals during the grievance-arbitration proceedings, and the final arbitral result will be viewed to ensure conformity with the timehonored Spielberg criteria. In this fashion the Board has sought to
encourage private dispute settlement as a fundamental means of
avoiding labor strife, while fulfilling its public responsibilities by
retaining jurisdiction over the controversy to assure that the purposes of the Act are effectuated.
308. Cf. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1970). See text
accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
309. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1970).
310. See note 42 supra.
311. See NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1971); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198
n.6 (1962).
312. Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973), enforcing sub nom. Teamsters
Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (July 31, 1972); Associated Press v.
NLRB, Nos. 73-1002 & 73-1390 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 20, 1974), denying review of 199 N.L.R.B.
No. 168 (Oct. 27, 1972); Provision House Workers Local 274 v. NLRB, No. 72-2617 (9th Cir.,
Feb. 21, 1974), denying review of Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (June 30,
1972). See also note 72 supra.
313. Remarks at A.B.A. Convention, Aug. 7, 1973, Washington, D.C., reported in ABA
Panel Views on Boys Markets, Collyer Rulings, 83 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 355, 357 (1973).

